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Abstract
The first chapter studies how two different financial institutions– asset markets
and financial intermediaries– allow consumers to allocate their resources over a pe-
riod and provide liquidity to them when facing liquidity preference shocks and ran-
dom returns on illiquid assets. For that purpose, an overlapping generations model
in which agents are subject to random relocation shocks is formed. Fiat money
is introduced explicitly as a tool for consumers to address limited communication
and random relocation problems. This article also analyses the mechanism of asset
price determination when the economy is hit by several stochastic shocks by drawing
together the results of the scattered studies into a comprehensive view. The frame-
work and outcomes of this chapter will also be used as the basis for chapters 2 and 3.
In Chapter 2 it is shown that under asymmetric information and limited partici-
pation in financial markets, bank runs (or bankruptcy) may help uninformed agents
to achieve an efficient allocation since bank runs can reveal hidden information. The
production of information is made efficiently without cost, at which point there is
a distinction between this paper and most other related studies. The efficient bank
run provides a new ground for the coexistence of banks and financial markets. Even
when all the agents deposit their whole endowment goods with the bank, financial
intermediaries and markets coexist once bank runs happen. Allowing a run implies
that investment in liquidity can be minimised. This effect is strengthened when
agents have limited access to a market.
In Chapter 3 a general equilibrium model is made by applying the Lucas island
model and the random-relocation model and the following results are derived: (1)
The amount of liquid assets held by the whole economy, as well as the regions where
securitization is present, decreases significantly with securitization. As the economy
can invest its resources more efficiently, both consumption and welfare increase.
The impact of securitization on banks’ liquidity, consumption, and welfare, however,
depend on the population structure of each region. This result may have important
policy implications with regards to the effect of global asset shortages on bubbles
and global imbalances. (2) Expansionary monetary policy can affect the bank’s
portfolio composition, but this outcome depends on the magnitude of the elasticity
of substitution coefficients. (3) A randomised monetary policy combined with other
real shocks cause banks to suffer from a signal extraction problem.
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Thesis Introduction
One of the biggest lessons we learned during the 2008 financial crisis is that we need
to better understand the relationship between liquidity, the financial intermediaries,
and financial markets. The financial crises that occurred at different times are not so
different from each other in their causes and process (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
Often the crises are accompanied by a bubble in asset prices and their collapses,
and associated with the banking crisis. Also, many instances of crises have been
preceded by financial innovations which accelerate asset price bubbles. The collapse
of the bubble and the resulting sharp fall in asset prices, on the one hand, increase
the demand for liquidity of financial institutions and on the other, they lead to a
decline in liquidity supply in the financial market. This liquidity shortage may force
financial institutions to sell their assets at fire-sale prices, which in turn accelerates
the price collapse.
This thesis studies the relationship between financial intermediaries1 and mar-
kets. Liquidity and asset prices play a vital role in establishing relationships between
two different financial systems. In some cases, markets and banks will be analysed
separately, and in some cases, we will see how equilibria are achieved when two in-
stitutions coexist. Consumers face liquidity preference shocks in the middle of their
period, and thus they need to hold liquid assets in order to cope with immediate
consumption even though liquid assets earn low returns. Both market and banks
function to provide liquidity to them. Their role, however, has a different impact
on consumers’ consumption and well-being, depending on various circumstances.
1Financial intermediaries are defined as the voluntary coalition by agents in this chapter, and
intermediaries, coalitions are used interchangeably with ‘banks’.
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Let’s take a closer look at the relationship between financial intermediaries and
markets before entering each chapter in earnest. There have been long debates on
the role of financial intermediaries and markets in providing liquidity to consumers
since the studies of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, the
argument for the role and functions of financial intermediaries and markets, and the
relationship between the two have yet to be clearly resolved. This is partly because,
as von Thadden (1999) pointed out, banking operation is varied and financial inter-
mediaries provide several different functions at the same time.2 Therefore, questions
and debates about the role of banks and markets often appear to be contradictory,
and “can only be productive if the context is spelled out clearly.”(von Thadden,
1999, p.992)
On the one hand, the mere fact that financial intermediaries exist may imply
that direct trade in a market between lenders and borrowers is dominated (Gorton
and Winton, 2003). This is because those institutions provide their customers with
some special services which cannot be easily replicated in capital markets. The fi-
nancial intermediaries, for example, dominate the market where securities, issued by
borrowers, are traded (Diamond, 1984). Another advantage of allocating resources
through banks is that banks are able to provide more liquidity3 than markets if the
degree of relative risk aversion, σ,4 is greater than 1. According to Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), banks make this possible through cross-subsidization between agents
facing liquidity shocks. Therefore, the liquidity provision by banks allows consumers
to achieve higher utility level than the one which can be attained when they directly
invest in the production technology or use financial markets only. This discussion
implies that financial intermediaries dominate financial markets, and there is no
rational for the existence of financial markets.
2Gorton and Winton (2003) classifies the role of banks as delegated monitors, information
producers, consumption smoothers, and liquidity provision.
3While liquidity usually means marketability, the meaning of ‘liquid asset’ in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) refers to its allowing for intertemporal consumption by economic agents when they
wish to. When I mean by ‘liquid asset’ from now on indicates the same meaning as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
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The role of banks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), however, may exist only “in
an environment in which people are isolated from each other” (Wallace, 1988, p.3).
If there exist full-participation markets, no cross-subsidization among early and late
consumers is possible, and no beneficial role of banks exists. According to Jacklin
(1987),5 banks are able to enhance liquidity through demand deposits only when
the direct holding of assets is restricted. If markets exist where equity shares are
traded, then this trading mechanism will weakly dominate intermediation.
Banks, on the other hand, would have no role in an economy where perfect
financial markets exist. For example, if agents have access to complete market,
then “in a competitive equilibrium, the size and composition of banks’ balance
sheet have no effect on other economic agents.” (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p.10).
Therefore, introducing both financial intermediaries and markets into an economy is
assuming either explicitly or implicitly the imperfect financial market. Informational
asymmetries6 and limited participation7 in a market are used often in the literature
to model incomplete markets structure. For example, Diamond (1997), faced with
the criticism described above, presents a model of limited participation where there
is still a scope for banks. With limited participation, banks create more liquidity
than financial markets and make the market more liquid. Financial intermediaries
and markets coexist, and the amount of cross-subsidization is reduced as more agents
participate in the market, but as long as there is a limited-participation market, it
is not eliminated. This discussion will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 2.
Chapter 1 analyses how markets and banks allocate resources over a period
and if each institution may provide liquidity efficiently to consumers who face un-
certainties. Consumers have preferences for liquidity because they are subject to
relocations shocks in the middle of their lives and thus uncertain about the place of
their consumption when an investment decision has to be made. The model used
throughout the thesis contrasts with the standard Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s
5See Haubrich and King (1990) and Hellwig (1994) in a similar vein
6The related papers are, for example, Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986),
and Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)
7See Allen and Gale (1994), Diamond (1997), and Allen and Gale (2009).
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model in that liquidity shocks are represented by the uncertainty about the place
of consumption rather than the timing of it. There is a maturity structure between
liquid and illiquid assets; more liquid assets yield a lower rate of return than that
of less liquid assets. Investors are willing to hold liquid assets despite the matu-
rity structure because of liquidity preference. The amount of liquidity provided to
agents differs depending on the availability of different institutional frameworks (for
example, whether they have access to markets and financial intermediaries or not,
and how the two institutions interplay each other), their preferences for liquidity
(attitude toward risk), and the information structure.
Also, this chapter provides the mechanism of asset prices determination, and how
asset prices affect the market equilibrium and the agent’s welfare. Many researchers
have studied these important problems, but their studies tend to be scattered around
the author’s interests. This chapter is meaningful in that it draws together the
results of the scattered studies into a comprehensive view. The framework and
outcomes of this chapter will also be used as the basis for chapters 2 and 3.
The purpose of the second chapter is to examine whether uninformed consumers
who face uncertainty can prevent losses arising from asymmetric information by
constructing a bank and operating it in a particular way. For that, this chapter
presents a theoretical model showing that financial intermediaries can play a special
role, that of revealing information without investing resources in order to identify
information when financial markets are imperfect. While this article shares some
similarities with standard models in that banks manage the problems resulting from
asymmetric information, the mechanism of processing or revealing information is
quite different from them.
The biggest difference between the previous studies and mine is that the financial
coalition by agents in this model does not produce information deliberately by invest-
ing some of its resources. The production of information is done efficiently without
cost throughout bank runs under certain conditions. In the process of motivating
the rationale for the existence of financial intermediation, information-asymmetric
12 THESIS INTRODUCTION
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problems of the uninformed agents are solved in relation to informed agents. I argue
that under asymmetric information and limited participation in financial markets,
bank runs (or bankruptcy) may help agents to achieve an efficient allocation since
bank runs can reveal hidden information, to which only a fraction of agents in the
economy are assumed to have access.
Therefore, the financial intermediaries in this model not only serve the standard
role of liquidity provision but also have an alternative justification based on infor-
mation processing when the economy faces uncertainty. This chapter also provides
a new ground for the coexistence of banks and financial markets. Even when all the
agents deposit their whole endowment goods with the bank, financial intermediaries
and markets coexist once (efficient) bank runs happen. The scale of banks under
asymmetric information and limited participation in relation to financial markets
are also considered.
The third chapter aims to analyse how monetary policy can affect the composi-
tion of banks’ portfolios and whether monetary policy can change the composition
of assets in the direction desired by the monetary authorities. The second part of
this chapter aims to examine how securitization affects the need for liquid assets
of individual banks, and the economy as a whole. To address the problem, I used
a simple overlapping generations model with fiat money, following the Lucas’ is-
land model and its simplified version, Wallace (1980). However, this chapter deals
with the general equilibrium problem, unlike Lucas (1972) and Wallace (1980), all
of which construct partial equilibrium models. The general equilibrium problem
arises because of the framework whereby the two islands are linked to each other.
Some of the members of each island move to different islands at some point after
random relocation shocks, which, in combination with other nominal and real uncer-
tainties, produces interesting results. Later in this chapter, we set up a model that
explains the relationship between securitization and the bank’s liquid asset holdings,
as well as the process by which banks in two different regions trade securities. This
framework provides a detailed description of how the changes in demand and supply
THESIS INTRODUCTION 13
Essays on Banking and Finance
structure of securities affect various key economic variables.
The first major finding of the third chapter is that expansionary monetary policy
can affect the bank’s portfolio composition and thus its depositors’ consumption and
welfare, but the outcome depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution
coefficients. When the consumer is less (resp. more) risk averse, the substitution
effect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the income effect and banks are willing to
hold more (resp. less) liquid assets in response to higher price levels than would oth-
erwise be the case. However, if a randomised monetary policy combines with other
real shocks, the bank suffers from a signal extraction problem. Since banks cannot
differentiate between the two elements of real and nominal factors that determine the
current price level, they react to changes in the nominal supply of money, not real
ones. This results in banks holding too many, and in some cases too few, liquid assets
when compared to under full information. Another interesting question is whether
monetary policy can change the composition of assets in the direction desired by
the monetary authorities. It is shown that the benefits from inflation surprises dis-
appear when economic agents understand the monetary authorities’ intention and
act accordingly. This leads only to inflation bias as Kydland and Prescott (1977),
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b)’s research shows.8
The second part of this chapter aims to examine how securitization affects the
need for liquid assets of individual banks, and the economy as a whole. First of all,
securitization not only allows banks to transform illiquid assets into liquid assets but
it also provides an alternative source for investment in liquid assets. In addition to
the liquid asset holdings in the region where securitization is possible, the liquid asset
reserves of the whole region combined are significantly reduced compared with before
securitization. This implies the economy uses its resources in a more productive way
to increase the total output across the two islands. One of the main conclusions is
8Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a), and Barro and Gordon (1983b)
showed the positive correlation between output and inflation cannot arise systematically when
agents have rational expectations. The benefits from inflation surprises disappear when economic
agents understand the monetary authorities’ intention and act accordingly and lead only to inflation
bias.
14 THESIS INTRODUCTION
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that the impact of securitization on banks’ liquidity, consumption, and welfare is
affected by the population structure of each island. If we assume two regions with
different demographics, the demographic structure affects not only the supply of
securities in an area where securitization is possible but also the size of demand in
the other region, which may lead to a different equilibrium through adjustment of
securities prices.
These results have important policy implications, especially when looking at the
work of Caballero (2006), Caballero et al. (2008), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2009), which analyse the effect of global asset shortages on bubbles and global im-
balances. Also, these results have great similarities with the study of Bencivenga
and Smith (1991). Based on the random-relocation economy, Bencivenga and Smith
(1991) showed that the introduction of financial intermediaries might affect the com-
position of savings toward more productive assets, capital, and thus intermediaries
enhance growth by reducing socially unnecessary capital liquidation. Securitization
introduced in this chapter shows that the need for liquid assets, required for movers
facing liquidity shocks but provide low rates of return, can be reduced significantly
in a general equilibrium setting.
Chapter 15
Chapter 1
Liquidity, Asset Prices and
Welfare
1.1 Introduction
One of the biggest lessons we learned during the 2008 financial crisis is that we
need to better understand the relationship between liquidity, the financial inter-
mediaries, and financial markets. Liquidity is one of the investor’s main concerns
because they may face liquidity preference shocks; thus they need to hold liquid
assets in order to cope with immediate consumption, even though liquid assets earn
low returns. Depositing with a bank has been regarded as a solution to this matu-
rity structure problem since the seminal studies of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) on banking. However, this maturity structure may cause financial
intermediaries to be vulnerable to consumers’ sudden demands for liquidity because
of the maturity mismatch between the bank’s liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.
Liquidity also affects financial markets via changes in asset prices because liquidity
affects the demand for, and supply of, the assets directly. Changing asset prices in-
fluence the expected returns on the illiquid assets; thus change consumers’ portfolio
decisions. Investors’ changing preferences toward more liquid assets (for example,
from commercial papers or ABS toward U.S. government securities) would affect
16
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consumption, borrowing firms’ financing needs, and growth. There have been long
debates on the role of financial intermediaries and markets in providing liquidity to
consumers. However, the argument for the role and functions of financial interme-
diaries and markets, and the relationship between the two have yet to be clearly
resolved.
This chapter aims to analyse the role of markets and banks in allocating resources
over the period, and in providing liquidity to consumers who face uncertainties. Con-
sumers have a preference for liquidity because they are subject to relocation shocks
in the middle of their lives, and are thus uncertain about the place of their consump-
tion when an investment decision has to be made. There is a maturity structure
between liquid and illiquid assets; more liquid assets yield a lower rate of return
than less liquid assets. Investors are willing to hold liquid assets despite the matu-
rity structure because of liquidity preference. The amount of liquidity provided to
agents differs depending on the availability of different institutional frameworks (for
example, whether they have access to markets and financial intermediaries or not,
and how the two institutions interplay each other), and their preference (attitude
toward risk).
In addition, this paper provides the mechanism of asset prices determination,
and how asset prices affect the market equilibrium and the agent’s welfare. These
significant problems have been studied by many researchers, but their studies tend
to be scattered around the author’s interests. This paper is meaningful in that it
draws together the results of the scattered studies to a comprehensive view. The
framework and outcomes of this chapter will also be used as the basis for chapters
2 and 3.
The first issue to be addressed in this chapter is to look at the properties of asset
prices. In this discussion, we examine what role liquidity plays in determining asset
prices and how various stochastic shocks affect them. The definition of an asset’s
market liquidity is used with different meaning according to the context. Generally,
an asset’s liquidity means the asset’s ability to be bought and sold quickly without
Chapter 1.1. INTRODUCTION 17
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having to reduce its price at low transaction costs (Keynes, 1930). However, in the
widely-used, standard banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the asset’s
liquidity is related to the intertemporal consumption allocation. Thus, if a specific
asset is called a ‘liquid’ asset, it implies that it allows consumers to consume over
intertemporally when they wish to. A ‘liquid asset’ in this chapter is used in the
same sense to refer to its allowing for intertemporal consumption by economic agents
when they want to.
An asset price is determined by the demand and supply of the asset within the
return of the asset. According to Allen and Gale (1994, 2009), the price of an asset
is simply equal to the discounted value of future dividends (a fundamental value)
when the demand for assets is large enough. However, if the available liquidity (the
demand for the assets) is insufficient, then assets are traded at prices lower than the
fundamental value, and the market undergoes ‘cash-in-the-market pricing’. The first
part of this chapter summarizes the findings of Allen and Gale (1994, 1997, 2009),
Allen et al. (2009), Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), and Diamond (1997) and applies
them to an overlapping generations (OLGs) model with fiat money.1 The economy
faces two different shocks: random relocation shocks and shocks on the return of
illiquid assets. It shows that the demand and supply of assets are determined by
market liquidity. While the amount of liquidity is determined in the process of an
individual agent’s optimising behaviour, it is closely related to how stochastic shocks
are realised.2
The second part of this chapter discusses how financial markets and banks ad-
dress the agent’s intertemporal optimisation problem. When a new generation ap-
pears in the economy at date t, each member of it constructs her portfolio consisting
of liquid and illiquid assets to optimise her consumption allocation at the beginning
1All these models deal with Walrasian equilibrium to determine asset prices. There exists,
however, a new stream of study on asset-pricing. For example, Duffie et al. (2005) use search and
bargaining model to study how asset prices are determined.
2Asset prices are also affected by the number of market participants and information structure.
This chapter deals only with the effect of liquidity preferences and uncertainty on asset returns on
the asset price. The effect of limited participation and the role of asymmetric information in the
determination of asset prices are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the effect
of the population structure on the asset price.
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of period t. The new-born agents construct their portfolios by trading their endow-
ment maximisations with fiat money or investing in illiquid assets. However, the
economy has no complete markets where Arrow securities are traded. Therefore,
consumers cannot trade contingent commodities corresponding to states of nature.3
The financial market is held after relocation shocks are revealed, and before agents
are relocated. Trades occur between agents who belong to the same generation but
have different preferences for liquidity, and the portfolio is rebalanced to fit their
interests accordingly. Markets can achieve the efficient allocation if the degree of
relative risk aversion, σ,4 is 1 (the log case). However, if σ > 1 (resp. σ < 1), then
the market provides insufficient (resp. more) liquidity than efficient one. Finan-
cial intermediaries may address this problem efficiently and thus provide consumers
with efficient risk-sharing if it were not for bank runs.5 In particular, if the return
on assets is uncertain, banks can provide more efficient risk sharing than financial
markets by allowing bank runs. This result is obtained by applying Allen and Gale
(1998) to the stochastic relocation model.6
The main configuration of the model used in this chapter is a modified form of the
Champ et al. (1996) model. Champ et al. (1996) constructs an OLGs model where
agents are born on one of two islands. The model considers the role of currency and
they show monetary factors play a specific role in banking panics. Except for as-
sumptions in the basic set-up, however, this paper is not directly related to Champ
et al. (1996) in its content. Based on the random-relocation economy, Bencivenga
and Smith (1991) showed that the introduction of financial intermediaries might
affect the composition of savings toward more productive assets (illiquid assets),
3Except for this, the market is assumed to be complete. Therefore, markets are perfectly
competitive, there are neither externalities nor asymmetric information, and no transactions cost
is present.
4The degree of relative risk aversion is defined as σ = −u
′′(c)c
u′(c) .
5An in-depth discussion of the relationship between financial intermediaries and financial mar-
kets is addressed in Chapter 2. It is discussed that the amount of liquidity provided to agents is
varied when both institutions coexist facing more than one exogenous shocks and asymmetrical
information.
6Allen and Gale (1998) is representative of several papers dealing with efficient bank runs.
Related papers are Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), and Diamond
and Rajan (2001), just to name a few. Chapter 2 discusses in detail how banks provide effective
risk sharing through these bank runs under asymmetric information.
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and thus intermediaries enhance growth by reducing socially unnecessary capital
liquidation.7 Bhattacharya and Singh (2008) formed OLGs model, in which lim-
ited communication and stochastic relocation exist, to study the optimal choice of
monetary policy instruments.
There are many papers which introduce Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s model
into an OLGs model. The OLGs model makes the studies possible on dynamic
effects of shocks and monetary policy on the equilibrium and welfare belonging to
different generations. For example, while Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explain that
a run on the bank is due to excessive withdrawals from the late consumers, who
belong to the same generation as early consumers, Qi (1994) shows that it could
be the result of the lack of new deposits from posterior generations. Allen and
Gale (1997) introduces banks which conduct a role for smoothing intertemporal and
intergenerational risks when risky assets, which are assumed to last forever, pays a
random payment in each period.8
Another feature of this chapter is the explicit introduction of fiat money in the
framework of OLGs model. In an OLGs model, the young do not have any incen-
tive to trade with the old because the old cannot provide anything valuable to the
young. Money is used for means that make intergenerational transactions possible
by removing the friction which exists between generations. According to Kocher-
lakota (1998), decentralised solution in which inter-generational transfers occur may
achieve an efficient allocation without using money, if perfect social record keeping
(“memory”) is possible and the economy can enforce sufficient punishment for trans-
gressions. However, if these requirements are not met, then money plays a pivotal
role to support the intergenerational trade. In other words, “money is memory.”
We assume in this chapter that the claims on capital are useless due to lim-
ited communication between islands. With this limited communication assumption,
along with stochastic relocation shocks, money is valued and essential for old-age
7In Chapter 3 of this doctoral thesis I have shown that the introduction of securitization can
bring about similar results to Bencivenga and Smith (1991)’s conclusions.
8Freeman (1988) presents an OLGs model as well to introduce banks as an optimal financial
coalition.
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consumption. Fiat money is not only used as a medium of exchange and a store of
value, but it is assumed to be accepted in any place and time. Capital is assumed to
be illiquid because it is hindered from moving between the two different locations,
and communication between places is limited. Suppose a person carries a paper
claim saying, for example, that she has a certain amount of capital in the place she
just left, but communication between two spatially separated places is limited. Lim-
ited communication implies that verifying that the claims she holds are accurate is
so costly to the potential buyers that there is no way to trade private claims against
the capital a person holds.
The role of fiat money as a store of value and medium of exchange using OLGs
model was first discussed in Samuelson (1958). Lucas (1972) introduced fiat money
as well to show how a positive short-term correlation existed between the rate of
change in money expansion and the level of GDP, and argued that the relationship
may disappear when the government tries to exploit it.9 Wallace (1980) presents
an OLGs model in which many important monetary issues are dealt with. Espe-
cially, Wallace (1980) formed micro-founded model of money applying Samuelson
(1958)’s model, in which money has a role of facilitating transactions across time
and generations.
The relatively new field of studying, which is known by the name New Mone-
tarist economics, uses search theory to study the micro-foundations of money. Some
of its main questions are: “What is liquidity?”, “Is money essential in achieving
desirable outcomes?”, “When can asset prices differ from fundamentals?” and so
forth (Lagos et al., 2015, Abstract).10 However, this chapter concentrates on the
standard Walrasian competitive equilibrium. If the results of Chapters 2 and 3 and
the findings of New Monetarist literature are synthesised, then we may have more
interesting results, but it is postponed to a later study.
9In Chapter 3, I study how monetary policy can affect the composition of banks’ portfolios
and whether monetary policy can change the composition of assets to the direction desired by the
monetary authorities following Lucas (1972) and Wallace (1980).
10Also see Waller (2015) in which he illustrates five main results which distinguish the New
Monetary economics model from the standard cash-in-advance model.
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
structure of the physical set-up, information, and money and financial market equi-
librium conditions. In section 1.3 the process of asset price determination is shown
in detail. Section 1.4 discusses how market equilibrium is achieved in the face of
various shocks. Section 1.5 deals with how banks can promote a consumer’s welfare
through bank runs when the economy is hit with shocks on the asset return. Sec-
tion 1.6 illustrates numerical examples discussed in Section 1.4 and 1.5. Concluding
remarks are contained in Section 1.7.
1.2 The Structure of the Economy
1.2.1 Random Relocation Model
The economy consists of two distinct, spatially separated locations (islands). Each
island is populated by two age cohorts: the young and the old. A young person, the
size of which on each island is normalised to one, is born on one of the two islands.
The population of the initial old is also normalised to unit mass. Each young agent,
ex-ante identical, is born with a unit of endowment goods at date t and has nothing
at a subsequent date. The goods can be used for consumption or investment, but
are restricted from moving across the two islands. Each young person faces privately
observable, stochastic relocation shocks in the middle of date t.
If a young agent, who is born on the home island, is subject to relocation shocks,
she is called a mover and is relocated to the foreign island to spend her old age there.
Let λ be the probability that a young person is subject to relocation shocks. This
assumption plays the same role as the preference shocks which divide agents into
‘early’ and ‘late’ consumers in standard Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type model. We
assume that the probability of being relocated is the same on both islands. If there
were no aggregate relocation shocks, there were large numbers of young agents, and
their relocation shocks are assumed to be independent, then the fraction of movers
are equal to the probability of being a mover according to the Law of Large Numbers.
22 Chapter 1.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
Essays on Banking and Finance
All agents are assumed to consume only in their old age and thus are uncertain
about the precise place where to consume. The agent’s problem born at date t will
be that of maximizing the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
Et[U(cm,t+1, cn,t+1;λ)] = λu(cm,t+1) + (1− λ)u(cn,t+1),
where cm,t+1 (resp. cn,t+1) denotes the consumption of a mover (resp. a nonmover)
who is born at date t and consume at t + 1. The utility function satisfies the
usual neoclassical properties (increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously
differentiable).
1.2.2 Portfolio Decision
Each person needs to save for the old-age consumption. There are two different assets
that she is able to access: a liquid asset (fiat money) and an illiquid asset (capital).
Let pt be the nominal price of one unit of consumption goods at date t. Then one
unit of the goods which is traded for fiat money at date t yields pt/pt+1 units of
consumption goods. pt/pt+1 is assumed to be less than or equal to 1 because pt+1 is
expected to be greater than or equal to pt (total money supply is expected to grow
or remain unchanged.). The illiquid asset (capital) takes two periods to mature11
and allows one unit of the goods invested in the current period to be converted into
R > 1 units of the goods at date t+1.12 There exists a trade-off between an asset’s
liquidity and its return. The illiquid asset is immobile and takes two periods to
mature, but pays a higher return. The liquid asset is mobile, universally accepted,
and takes no time to mature, but yields a lower return.
11Therefore, the illiquidity of capital is captured in two dimensions: the mismatch between asset
maturity and liquidity preferences, and limited communication due to its immobility.
12The linear capital production technology (constant returns-to-scale technology) was introduced
into the overlapping generations model by Cass and Yaari (1966) and the assumption is widely
used in the literature.
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Portfolio Allocation with Financial Markets and Banks
The portfolio decision depends on the agent’s (prior) expectations about risk and
the attitude toward risk. This decision is made irrevocably before the preference
shocks are revealed. The consumer spends the fraction q for fiat money among
her endowment and acquires ptq units of fiat money from the trade because the
nominal price of one unit of the goods at date t is pt. The remaining fraction k of
her endowment is invested in the illiquid asset (capital). Then the agent’s budget
constraint is given as
q + k = 1 (1.1)
The consumption of the agent depends on her choice on q and how uncertainty is
realised. However, the economy has no complete markets where Arrow securities are
traded. Therefore, consumers cannot trade contingent commodities corresponding
to states of nature when they construct their portfolio. The financial market is held
after relocation shocks are revealed, and before agents are relocated. The market is
complete because now all uncertainties are resolved. Trades occur between agents
who belong to the same generation but have different preferences for liquidity, and
the portfolio is rebalanced to fit their interests accordingly.
The welfare of consumers is enhanced when they have access to financial markets
than they are in autarky. This is because the market expands the feasible set of
the individual agent by allowing a consumer to trade her private claims with other
cohorts.13 Banks can increase consumers’ welfare as well. The young people deposit
their endowment goods with a competitive bank which uses the proceeds to acquire
assets on behalf of them. Banks provide its depositors insurance against relocation
shocks because it can choose an efficient portfolio by using the law of large numbers.
13Without financial markets, the capital investment is useless to movers because of the assump-
tion of the limited communication.
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1.2.3 Structure of Uncertainty, Information
There are two main views to explain the causes of bank runs or banking crises. The
first perspective is that a bank run is caused by panics. The most influential study
taking this perspective is Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in which they developed a
model of bank runs as self-fulfilling prophecies. The other view sees bank runs as
a natural result of the business cycle. Depositors who expect the economic funda-
mentals to deteriorate in the near future withdraw their deposits in anticipation of
the insolvency of the bank. Gorton (1988) raised the view that the financial crisis
is the result of the business cycle from the empirical study on the National Banking
Era. Allen and Gale (1998) formed a theoretical model to discuss how the business
cycle causes banking distress.
Therefore, we can roughly divide uncertainty into two broad categories, depend-
ing on the reasons for the bank run: intrinsic or extrinsic uncertainty. According to
Allen and Gale (2004), intrinsic uncertainty indicates that the fundamentals of the
economy fluctuate stochastically, such as a preference for liquidity or a change in
the return of assets. Extrinsic uncertainty, on the other hand, implies that endoge-
nous variables are influenced by extraneous variables (sunspots) that do not directly
affect fundamentals.
In this chapter, we ignore the possibility of a bank run equilibrium due to
sunspots and focus only on the intrinsic uncertainty that causes a bank run. In
other words, this article deals only with the case where agents ex-ante expect the
possibility of runs because of the uncertainty associated with fundamentals.14 Banks
construct their portfolio weighing the costs of avoiding defaults (by holding sufficient
liquidity) and the benefits allowing it to happen. Banks find the optimal deposit
contract to maximise the expected utility of depositors considering this cost and
benefit.15
14The bankruptcy caused by the panic as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is an entirely unex-
pected event at the time when a bank constructs its portfolio. If the bank run had been anticipated
in advance, the bank would have built a different portfolio to reflect this fact. See Allen and Gale
(2009, Ch.3) for more details.
15Because of free entry into the banking industry and competition in it, banks will offer demand
deposit contracts so as to maximise the agent’s expected utility.
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We deal with three different sources of intrinsic uncertainty following Allen and
Gale (1998, 2004) and Allen et al. (2009). First, individual consumers face id-
iosyncratic relocation shocks. Second, the economy as a whole faces the aggregate
uncertainty about the number of movers. Finally, the rate of return on the capital
is uncertain. Uncertainty about the return on capital is introduced to reflect the
impact of the business cycle on the asset value of the bank.
All uncertainties are resolved in the middle of each period. Each consumer learns
whether she is a mover or a nonmover, which is private information and thus not
observed publicly. Except for that information, the actual values of each random
variable are publicly observed, i.e., other information about fundamentals is observed
with accuracy.
In the asymmetrical information situation, only some consumers (known as in-
formed agents) are assumed to have access to the information on the rate of returns
on assets and the total fraction of movers. This case is discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 2. The following subsections analyse each uncertainty as isolated, taking other
information is given. More complicated cases combining two different uncertainties
are dealt in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Preference Uncertainty
Inhabitants of both islands are ex-ante identical, but each island faces aggregate
relocation shocks in each period. The number of movers, λθ, is a stochastic variable
which is assumed to take the following form16
λθ = α + εθ
α is a probability of the young being a mover without aggregate shocks and is
16If individual bank faces idiosyncratic liquidity shocks on the fraction of movers, which is
uncorrelated with other island’s uncertainty, then λθ can be represented as
λiθ = αi + εθ
following Allen and Gale (2004) and Allen et al. (2009). In this case αi is a random variable and
can take different supports according to the formation of a model.
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equal to the fraction of movers following the law of large numbers. θ is a random
variable which denotes the aggregate uncertainty about the fraction of the mover
of the economy and ε is a positive constant. Let the random variable θ take the
following values:
θ =
 0, with probability ωl1, with probability ωh
Note that the population of two different islands remains the same when they suffer
aggregate relocations shocks because both islands experience the same shocks at the
same time.
Uncertainty on Asset Returns
The capital invested at date t using a unit of endowment goods transforms it into
RH units of consumption goods with probability ρH or RL with probability ρH ,
where RH > RL > 0.
Rj =
 RH , with probability ρHRL, with probability ρL
The relations of the rate of returns between different assets are assumed to be
following:
Assumption 1 Money Supply is constant over periods.
Assumption 2
E[Rj] = ρHRH + ρLRL > Et[pt/pt+1] (1.2)
The above assumption tells us that the expected rate of return on an illiquid asset
is greater than that of fiat money, which is needed for the agent to hold capital. She
would hold the risky asset if and only if the expected rate of return on capital is
greater than the rate of return on currency. Even though pt and pt+1 is determined
endogenously within the model, the rate of return on fiat money is just equal to 1
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because the money supply is assumed to remain constant in this chapter.17 Therefore






This assumption is needed for ensuring q > 0, which is used in Allen and Gale (1998).
If (q, k) = (0, 1), then movers will consume nothing and nonmovers consume Rj. The
preceding assumption tells us that the consumption of a mover will be increased
more than the reduction on the consumption of a nonmover if an agent increases in
investment in q by reducing the equal amount in k. (1.2) and (1.3) are a necessary
and sufficient condition for interior solution (i.e., for having both q > 0 and k > 0).
Assumption 4
0 < RL < pt/pt+1 < RH (1.4)
The preceding equation assumes specific relations between rates of returns of differ-
ent assets. Even though the average returns from the illiquid asset is greater than
liquid asset, there is a chance of capital return being lower than that of fiat money.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we will look at the equilibrium conditions of markets.
Money Market Equilibrium
No one in the future generations is born with fiat money. For young agents to
acquire fiat money, they must trade with the initial old who live on the same island
as them and are endowed in total with M units of fiat money at time t. Let the
real demand for fiat money (the number of goods each young agent chooses to sell
his fraction of endowment for fiat money) be q. The price level at date t, pt, is
determined at the beginning of period t by the coincidence of the demand for fiat
17See Money Market Equilibrium part.
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In this chapter, we assume the constant money supply, so Mt+s = M, ∀s ≥ 0. Since
agents are ex-ante identical and the population of each island is assumed to be
constant over periods,18 all generations face the same decision problem. Therefore,
in a stationary equilibrium where the money supply is constant, q and thus pt have
constant values, i.e., pt+s = p for all s ≥ 0.
19
Asset Market Equilibrium
After uncertainties are revealed in the middle of period t, an asset market is held,
and movers and nonmovers trade with each other before movers are relocated. The
prevailing (nominal) price of the illiquid asset, Bt, clears the asset market at date t.
In each period t, the total amount of capital supplied by movers (the amount of fiat
money demanded) is Skt (= D
q
t ) = λθk, and the total amount of fiat money supplied
by the nonmovers (the demand for capital) is Sqt (= D
k
t ) = (1 − λθ)ptq. Therefore





The goods market clearing condition requires in each period t that




The left hand side of the equation denotes the total consumption of movers and
nonmovers combined, and the right hand side represents the sum of available con-
18This assumption cannot be sustained in situations where each island faces different population
structure, or where monetary authorities play an active role to affect the price level via expansionary
or contractionary monetary policy. This issue is discussed in Chapter 3.
19However, subscripts denoting time will sometimes be used for analysis convenience.
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sumption goods.
1.3 Properties of Asset Price
This section contains a detailed exposition on how the price of capital, an illiquid and
risky asset, is determined when the economy faces uncertainty on the fundamentals.
This discussion is based on the work of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Allen and Gale
(1994), and Diamond (1997), which discuss the process of asset price determination
in different situations.
1.3.1 Fundamental Asset Price
Assume that an asset market is held after the relocation shocks are revealed and
before movers are relocated. Let Bθjt be the (nominal) price of one unit of capital
traded in the asset market in period t facing uncertainties. θ and j denote the state










Proof The supply of capital comes from movers. They inelastically supply their
holdings of illiquid assets, whatever the price is. So there is a vertical supply curve,
and the quantity supplied is:
SK(= DM) = λθk
The demand for illiquid assets comes from nonmovers. Nonmovers need to decide
whether to hold fiat money and pass it over to the next period. For the decision,
they compare the expected rate of return on fiat money with that of capital. Let
γ be the ratio of money exchanged with capital. Then, 1 − γ fraction among their
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money holdings (ptq) is passed over to the date t + 1. γ takes a value between 0
and 1, and γ = 1 implies that nonmovers inelastically supply their whole fiat money
to the market. However, γ = 0 (all storage of fiat money) will not occur in an
equilibrium since as γ → 0, Bθjt → 0. So, as long as Rj > 0 there exists fiat money




, then no nonmovers would hold capital from date t to t + 1, which
implies γ = 0. If Rj =
Bθjt
pt+1
, then the two assets are perfect substitutes to nonmovers.
Thus, any γ between 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is possible. If Rj >
Bθjt
pt+1
, no nonmovers would hold
fiat money from date t to t + 1, which implies γ = 1. Then, for the nonmovers to
trade fiat money for capital, it is required that Bθjt ≤ pt+1Rj. The maximum price
of the the asset is Bθjt = pt+1Rj.
Therefore, the aggregate demand for capital of nonmovers is
DK(= SM) = (1− λθ)γptq
The asset market clearing condition requires that
λθkB
θj





If the market has enough liquidity (i.e.,SM > DM ), then the asset price would
reach its highest possible point, pt+1Rj. However, if the market suffers liquidity
shortage for any reason, the price will be determined by the amount of cash supplied.
This is known as ‘cash-in-the-market pricing’ in which the asset price is determined
as the ratio of total available ‘cash’ to the amount of asset provided (Allen and Gale,
1994, 2009). 
1.3.2 With No Uncertainty
Proposition 1.3.2 Suppose an economy which faces no uncertainty. The price of
an illiquid asset, Bt, is determined uniquely such that Bt = pt.
Chapter 1.3. PROPERTIES OF ASSET PRICE 31
Essays on Banking and Finance
Proof Proposition 1.3.2 implies that the price of capital sold at date t is equal
to the price of a unit of consumption goods. To prove that, let us consider the
consumer’s decision at date t. First, suppose that Bt > pt. Then capital would







, and a nonmover consumes R. However, since all agents
hold only capital in the first place and have no fiat money, the demand for capital
is zero. The price of capital will drop to zero as well, which is a contradiction.
Now suppose Bt < pt, then the liquid asset dominates the illiquid asset and









R > R. However, when
nonmovers try to trade fiat money for capital, there will be no supply of capital,





, another contradiction. 
1.3.3 Uncertainty on Asset Returns
Proposition 1.3.3 Suppose the following
1. No uncertainty on liquidity shocks exis, i.e., λθ = α.
2. The random variable Rj takes on the value of RH with probability of ρH and
RL with probability of ρL,
3. All assets are held by consumers
Then, given α q, k, pt, and pt+1, the following holds
1. The date t price of one unit of capital, Bjt , is less than or equal to pt+1Rj.













20Strictly speaking, the notation of Bjt should be B
θj
t . However, for simplicity of notation,
superscripts are used for denoting stochastic variables that are currently in question only. The
superscripts which are not shown in Bθjt imply that the random variable concerning the uncertainty
is not stochastic.
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2. γH is equal to 1 as long as pt+1RH >
γH(1−α)ptq
λθk






















Proof One unit of consumption goods is exchanged for pt units of currency, and pt
units of fiat money purchases pt/B
j
t units of capital. pt/B
j
t units of capital produce
ptRj
Bjt
units of consumption goods at date t + 1. If a consumer acquires pt units of
fiat money at date t and holds until the date t + 1, she is able to purchase pt/pt+1
units of consumption goods at date t+ 1.
All fiat money is inelastically supplied to the market for buying capital and cash
is dominated between the period t and t + 1, and thus γ becomes 1, if and only if










The preceding equation implies that agents will want to hold only capital from
period t to period t+ 1 when the rate of return on capital is high. Since the rate of
return on capital takes two different values, it is assumed that the preceding relation
holds only when Rj = RH without loss of generality. The value of γ with RH , γ
H ,








A similar discussion can be made when the random variable Rj takes the value RL.
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γL is adjusted such that pt+1RL =
γL(1−α)ptq
αk
. Therefore, the price of capital in the
state of L, BLt , is




Note that γL takes on any value between 0 < γL < 1 depending on parameter values.









, the asset price
in this section cannot be higher than the fundamental value, pt+1Rj. The market
always undergoes “underpricing” (Allen and Gale, 1994).21
1.3.4 Liquidity Uncertainty
Proposition 1.3.4 Suppose that the economy suffers aggregate uncertainty on the
fraction of movers, then the fraction of movers at date t is given as
λθ = α + εθ
The random variable θ takes on the value of 0 with probability ωl and 1 with prob-
ability ωh. Also assume that capital returns have a fixed value at R = RH , then
the capital prices at date t facing aggregate liquidity shocks, Bθt , have the following
21Asking if the asset price always takes the value less than the fundamental value is questioning
whether ‘bubbles’ may exist or not. This is an interesting question but is not dealt with in
this article. See Prize (2013) for an introductory description of whether financial assets reflect
fundamental values or bubbles exist.
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Note that γj = 1 irrespective of the state j because the asset return is given
as a definite value R = RH ≥
Bθt
pt+1
. and thus no fiat money is stored (see Proposi-
tion 1.3.3). By construction, we have the following
λ0 = α < λ1 = α + ε




,22 the price of capital in
the state 0, B0t , is higher than or equal to that in the state of h, B
h










t = pt+1R), (1.13)
Note that, however, B0t cannot be equal to B
1








23, which implies that capital dominates fiat money. If agents






= R > pt
pt+1
. No one would hold fiat money in the first place, which




Additional condition, B1t < pt < B
0
t , is required because otherwise fiat money
is (weakly) dominated by capital as well. If B0t > B
1
t ≥ pt, then a consumer

























, the only way B0t = B
1




t having the funda-
mental value.
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Proposition 1.3.2). Also, if B1t < B
0




























1.4 Equilibrium with Markets
Consider an economy that does not have financial intermediaries and has only asset
markets, which are incomplete because of lacking Arrow securities. This section
deals with the relationship between asset prices and market liquidity and shows how
individual agents optimize their utility using markets.
1.4.1 Consumption
A consumer, who turns out to be a mover, sells her entire holdings of capital at
a nominal price Bθjt before she is relocated. She inelastically supplies her capital
holdings, whatever the price is. The total unit of currency the mover accumulates




The second term denotes the amount of fiat money the mover obtains from selling
her illiquid assets to nonmovers who belongs to the same generation as her. Then







The consumption depends on: the price of an illiquid asset at date t, Bθjt , and the
gross real rate of return on fiat money over one-period, pt/pt+1.
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Nonmovers need to decide how much capital to buy from movers considering the
expected rate of returns of the two different assets, unlike movers facing a trivial
decision problem. If they use γj ratio of its cash holdings to purchase illiquid assets,
then they could buy γ
jptq
BLt
units of capital. According to Proposition 1.3.3, γj = 1
when Rj = RH and 0 < γ
j < 1 when Rj = RL.
1.4.2 Efficient Risk Sharing
Let’s take a look at the case of the efficient allocation achieved by the social planner
as a baseline model. All variables are assumed to be deterministic and uncertainty
is assumed to be absent. The number of movers on each island is assumed to be
λθ = α and the illiquid asset return is given as Rj = R.
Suppose that the social planner maximises the welfare of the young agents born
at date t, then the problem will be
max
cm,t+1,cn,t+1
Et[U(cm,t+1, cn,t+1)] = αu(cm,t+1) + (1− α)u(cn,t+1) (1.16)









and the incentive constraint
cm,t+1 ≤ cn,t+1 (1.19)
The incentive constraint is needed if the individual type is a private information.
Each individual will reveal her true type if and only if (1.19) is satisfied. By sub-
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stituting the budget constraint into objective function, the Lagrangian function of
this optimization model is given as











+ (1− q)R− αcm,t+1 − (1− α)cn,t+1
]
where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers which both have non-negative values. Note
that the incentive constraint (1.19) are not included in the preceding equation. As
shown below, this is because the incentive constraint is always satisfied automatically
when we optimize this problem only with the first three constraints.24
We have the following set of simultaneous equations of the first-order conditions
with respect to consumption:
(cm,t+1) u
′ (cm,t+1) = µ1 + µ2
(cn,t+1) u
′ (cn,t+1) = µ2
Note that α terms disappear, which shows the reason why the social planner achieves
the efficient allocation; the social planner is able to use the law of large numbers to
choose the efficient portfolio irrespective of the individual agent’ preference shocks.
Non-binding feasibility condition (1.17) implies that cm,t+1 = cn,t+1 because µ1 = 0.
When (1.17) is binding, it implies cm,t+1 < cn,t+1 because µ1 > 0. Therefore, the
incentive constraint is always satisfied in any case. The first order condition with





Combining all these first order conditions we have the following efficient risk-sharing
24See the Appendix of Allen and Gale (1998) where they showed this result.
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= u′ (cn,t+1)R (1.20)
1.4.3 Equilibrium with No Uncertainty
Following Proposition 1.3.2, the capital is traded at the price of Bt = pt. The young
born at date t maximises their expected utility given λθ = α and Rj = R
max
cm,cn
Et[U(cm,t+1, cn,t+1)] = αu(cm,t+1) + (1− α)u(cn,t+1) (1.21)
subject to (1.1), (1.14), and (1.15). γj is 1 from Proposition 1.3.3. (1.14) and (1.15)
is simplified as following using the fact Bt = pt, and assuming constant money







Efficient solution requires satisfying (1.20). However, the market allocation
(1.22) is efficient only when the degree of the relative risk aversion (RRA) is equal









With log utility the preceding equation holds, which implies the market allocation
is efficient.


















< R1−σ = Ru′(R)
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The previous equation implies that the consumption of a mover should be increased
to hold efficiency condition, which is unattainable in a market. This result suggests
that the markets provide consumers with insufficient liquidity than the efficient
allocation.
Table 1.1 shows the numerical examples with three different values of σ =
0.5, 1, 1.5 to examine the effect of different σ on equilibria. The number of movers is
given as λθ = α = 0.5, the rate of return on capital, R, is 2, and the money supply
at date t is normalized to 1.























1.4.4 Equilibrium with Random Asset Returns
Consumers try to maximise their expected utility by choosing the optimal portfolio
(q, k), taking the price function Bjt and liquidity shock λθ as given. Assume that no







be the consumption of movers, nonmovers, and the price of capital facing random
capital returns Rj respectively. The problem posed will be that of maximizing the
following expected utility function
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In a state of RH , nonmovers hold only capital from t to t+1 by trading all their
fiat money for capital since RH ≥
BHt
pt+1
. On the other hand, when Rj = RL they
may keep some currency until the date t+ 1.
































BLt = pt+1RL =
γL(1− α)ptq
αk
Note that the consumption of both movers and nonmovers in the state of RL is equal
to each other. Substituting (1.24) and (1.1) into the objective function, (1.23), and
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Solving the preceding equation gives the optimal value of q. The numerical example
for this problem is illustrated in Section 1.6.
1.4.5 Equilibrium with Aggregate Relocation Shocks
This part discusses the market equilibrium with aggregate relocation shocks. The
fraction of movers is given as λθ = α+ εθ, and θ takes the value of 0 (resp. 1) with









































































which gives us the optimal value of q.
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1.5 Bank Equilibrium
Now suppose that young agents born at date t can organise an institution called a
bank. They deposit all their endowment goods with a bank, and it uses the proceeds
to acquire assets in favour of its members.25 Banks function as liquidity providers.
Free entry into the banking industry forces banks to compete by offering deposit
contracts that maximise the expected utility of the consumers.
At the beginning of each period, financial intermediaries take deposits from typi-
cal individuals and provide a standard deposit contract, promising consumers a fixed
amount of fiat money if they withdraw at date t, and consumption goods, cn,t+1,
if they withdraw at date t + 1. More specifically, the arrangement is comprised of
giving d units of fiat money if she withdraws at the end of period t irrespective of
the occurrence of the state of nature if it has enough liquid assets, or cn,t+1 units
of the consumption goods if she withdraws at date t + 1. d is the face value of the
deposit at t, thus movers will consume cm,t+1 = d/pt+1 in period t+ 1.
The standard deposit contract, however, cannot be made contingent on the asset
returns or the liquidity shocks because the contract is made before the uncertainties
are revealed. Therefore, if the bank does not have enough liquid assets to make the
promised payment, it pays out all available liquid assets and capital, divided equally
among those withdrawing. In dealing with situations of bank runs, I follow the
assumption in Allen and Gale (1998) rather than the ‘sequential service’ assumption
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
The consumption of a nonmover depends on the amount of d promised to movers,
and the fraction of nonmovers who join the withdrawal at date t along with movers.
Since the information on the ex-post agent’s type is assumed to be private, and
thus the bank cannot observe it publicly, the bank cannot tell if the withdrawer is
a mover or not. Therefore, a nonmover has an incentive to pretend to be a mover
unless the consumption of a nonmover is at least as much as that of a mover. We
require the following constraint
25See Chapter 2 where agents may hold capital directly instead of depositing in a bank.
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The preceding constraint, which is known as incentive compatibility constraint, tells
us that a nonmover does not have any incentive to pretend to be a mover as long
as she would get a higher consumption at their old-age. However, the incentive
constraints may not be satisfied, depending on how uncertainty is realised, and this
makes banks face defaults.
Suppose the following consumption function, which takes different values condi-

































m,t+1, cn,t+1);λθ, Rj] = λθu(c
θj
m,t+1) + (1− λθ)u(cn,t+1) (1.30)
subject to (1.27), (1.28), (1.29), and a budget constraint,
q + k = 1 (1.31)
1.5.1 No Uncertainty
First, let us consider the case where the optimizing bank faces no uncertainty. With
no uncertainty, the bank can achieve the first best allocation as in Section 1.4.2. A
bank signs a deposit contract with its depositors to pay a fixed nominal amount d
to anyone withdrawing at date t. The bank’s maximisation problem is expressed in
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Et[U(cm,t+1, cn,t+1)] = αu(cm,t+1) + (1− α)u(cn,t+1) (1.32)








(iv) cm,t+1 ≤ cn,t+1
(1.33)
This maximisation problem is exactly the same as that in Section 1.4.2 if the bank




the efficient allocation as shown in Section 1.4.2.
1.5.2 Equilibrium with Random Asset Returns
Assume that no other uncertainties exist except for Rj. All other variables are
assumed to be deterministic.
Contingent Deposit Contract
Suppose the case in which the deposit contract is possible to be conditional on the
return to the risky asset. More specifically, assume the contingent deposit contract
to give movers and nonmovers d
pt+1
and kRH respectively in the state of Rj = RH ,
and qpt
pt+1
+kRL equally to movers and nonmovers when Rj = RL. A bank maximises
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and the incentive constraint (1.27). The Lagrangian function of this optimization is












+ (1− q)Rj − αc
j




where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers both of which have non-negative values.
As the first-order conditions, we have the following set of simultaneous equations:













Thus incentive constraint is satisfied for all j = {H,L}. When the second constraint
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< cHn,t+1 = kRH (1.36)







Call this state of of Rj as RL. From the second feasibility condition in (1.35), and
using the fact cLm,t+1 = c
L







In this way, contingent deposit contract makes it possible to give movers and non-
movers d
pt+1




to movers and nonmovers when Rj = RL. Substituting (1.36) and (1.37) into the












































1.5.3 Equilibrium with Bank Runs
Deposit contract cannot be made state contingent, however, because the contract
is made before the uncertainty on the illiquid asset return is revealed. This section
shows whether banks can achieve the same allocation as contingent deposit con-
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tracts via (partial) bank runs in a specific state of nature when facing random asset
returns.26
The bank’s problem is the same as in (1.34) except that the amount of fiat money
promised to give to the person who withdraws at date t is not contingent on the
illiquid asset returns. Low capital return RL may imply the incentive constraint
(1.27) is not satisfied, in which case some nonmovers may wish to withdraw early
















Note that the consumption goods always remain at date t + 1 amounting RLk be-
cause of the assumption that the capital cannot be liquidated early and no financial
markets available exist. The nonmovers who do not join a run withdraw their de-
posits at date t+1. Let δ denote the proportion of nonmovers who join to withdraw
their deposits early, then we have the followings





















cL1n,t+1 denotes the consumption of early withdrawing nonmovers and c
L2
n,t+1 is the
consumption of nonmovers not withdrawing early. The first equation tells us that in
a situation of low return of capital, the consumption of movers and some fraction of
nonmovers combined is equal to the amount of liquid asset. The nonmovers who do
not join the early withdrawal will consume from the returns on capital investment.
In the end, three different types of consumers will end up consuming the same
amount of goods.
26This section is based on Allen and Gale (1997).
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On the other hand, when RH happens (which implies the incentive constraint is
met with strict inequality), agents consume the amount promised by the standard























Substituting (1.39), (1.40), and the budget constraint (1.31) into the objective




































































































This implies that the solution to this problem using the standard deposit contract
is the same as in contingent deposit contract and thus efficient27 when the bank










t+1, the second term in the last equation can be
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1.5.4 Equilibrium without Runs
Now suppose that a bank chooses its portfolio (q, k) and thus d such that runs
never happen, which implies that the bank chooses either a small d and/or a high
q to prevent default in equilibrium.28 In an equilibrium without default, the bank
promises the fixed nominal payment d to movers irrespective of the states j = (H,L)
at date t and nonmovers will receive the residue of the bank’s assets at date t + 1,
the amount of which should satisfy the incentive constraint, cjn,t+1 ≥ c
j
m,t+1 for any












Without loss of generality, we assume that cjm,t+1 = c
j
n,t+1 if j = L.
















+ kRj (=, if j = L)










The consumption of nonmovers, however, depends on the state Rj. When the capital
returns are low, the consumption of a nonmover is the same as that of a mover. The
amount of consumption is illustrated in (1.42), but the actual consumption of movers






















28Allen and Gale (2004) call these types of banks safe banks.
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Let Mcm denote the aggregate money held by movers. Among total money
holdings, M = ptq = 1,
29 Mcm is given to movers. d is determined such that
d = Mcm
α
, and each mover consumes d/pt+1. The remaining fiat money, M −Mcm is


























































Substituting the bank’s budget constraint (1.31), and the consumption functions
(1.42), (1.43), and (1.44) into the objective function, we have the following La-
29The total money supply of an island is normalized to 1.
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Solving the preceding equation gives the optimal q.
The consumption of a mover is always constant regardless of the state of nature,
but the consumption of a nonmover, on the other hand, depends on the value of the
random variable, Rj. Therefore, the solution to this problem that the bank’s using
a safe strategy and not allowing a run is not always efficient.
1.5.5 Equilibrium with Liquidity Shocks
The fraction of movers is a stochastic variable depending on the realisation of the
state θ. If interbank deposit contracts are available across different islands and the
shocks are correlated, then contingent contracts may be available as Bhattacharya
and Gale (1985) and Allen and Gale (2000) show.30 This chapter assumes that there
are no exchanges between banks located on different islands, so I will not discuss
how banks should deal with these issues further. The effect of liquidity shocks on the
risk-sharing when an economy has both markets and banks is discussed in detail in
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 it is shown that how the two islands can be interconnected
when one of them starts securitization.
30However, allowing interbank deposit markets may also cause a systemic crisis as studied in
their papers.
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1.6 Numerical Example
Let’s look at numerical examples analysed in Section 1.4 and 1.5 using specific
parameter values. Suppose that consumers have log utility and the economy faces
random asset return.
The initial money supply Mt is normalized to 1. Since no monetary expansion
or shrinkage are assumed, the current price level pt is equal to the next price level,
pt+1. Let the fraction of movers at date t be λθ = α = 0.5, and assume the random
variable Rj has the following two-point supports.
Rj =
 RH = 2.5, with probability ρH = 1/2RL = 0.5, with probability ρL = 1/2
The results with these parameter values are illustrated in Table 1.2. The row (I)
shows the equilibrium values with markets. When the capital return is low, the price
of capital is equal to the rate of return of the capital times future price level, i.e,
BLt = pt+1RL = 2×0.5 = 1. Nonmovers exchange 50% of its cash holdings for capital
and keep the remainder for the next period consumption (γL = 0.5). When the







Because of the insufficient liquidity, the price is determined following ‘cash-in-the-
market’ price (1−α)ptq
αk










= 0.5, nonmovers exchange all their
fiat money for capital, and thus γH = 1.
The row (II) illustrates the equilibrium values with contingent deposit contract.










= 1.7981 at date t + 1. In the






+0.3596× 0.5 = 0.8202 both
to movers and nonmovers equally.
The row (III) shows that the bank can achieve the same results as contingent
deposit contract if it allows a run. When Rj = RL, 56.16% of nonmovers withdraw
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at date t along with movers. The aggregate fiat money held by the bank is ptq =
1.5616× 0.6404 = 1, and 56.16% of nonmovers withdraw early. Since the aggregate
fraction of the young withdrawing at date t is α+δ(1−α) = 0.7808, the consumption




= 0.8202. Nonmovers who do not join the
run consume kRL
(1−δ)(1−α)
= 0.8202 as well. The market provides insufficient liquidity
than bank allocation when the economy faces random asset return. The bank holds
more liquid asset q = 0.6404 than the market q = 0.5 when the rate of return on
capital is stochastic.
Row (IV) shows the result of equilibrium values without a run. The safe bank
holds much higher liquid asset (q = 0.7143), but lower d = 1.231 than the case





= 0.8571. This is the sum of ptq
pt+1
= 0.7143 and kRL = 0.2857×0.5 =
0.1429. The remaining cash balances after movers’ withdrawing is ptq − Mcm =









+ 0.2857× 0.5 = 0.8571 as well.













































































Notes. (I) Market, (II) Contingent Contract, (III) With Run, (IV) No Run
31d = ptqα =
1.4×0.7143
0.5 = 1.2. Let denote Mcm be the aggregate money held by movers. Then
Mcm
pt+1α
= cLm,t+1 = 0.8571, which yields Mcm = 0.6. I.e., among total money holding M = ptq = 1,
60% is given to movers.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter studied the processes of how asset prices are determined when the
economic agents face various stochastic shocks. Based on that, this article analysed
how financial markets and intermediaries work to address the consumer’s problem:
allocating resources efficiently over a period of her life. Due to the maturity structure
and maturity mismatch between liquid and illiquid assets, the portfolio decision by
a consumer who are facing liquidity shocks must be made with caution.
The mechanism of asset prices determination is described in detail by drawing
together the results of the scattered studies to a comprehensive view. Facing random
returns of an illiquid asset and liquidity preference shocks, consumers trade their
assets at a price realized in the asset market according to the shocks. This article also
showed that forming a bank sometimes allows consumers to achieve higher utility
than using financial markets. Especially, when the agents are subject to random
returns on illiquid assets and bank runs are allowed to occur in a particular state
of nature, banks are shown to achieve efficient allocation as if contingent deposit
contract were made.
This chapter assumes complete markets, other than the fact that the Arrow
securities are not traded. Also, it was assumed that the market and the bank do
not coexist together, and thus allocation and welfare were analysed separately. If
incomplete markets were assumed, and both financial intermediaries and markets
coexist, then asset price and the amount of liquidity to be provided with consumers
would take a different form from the results analysed in this chapter. More in-depth
studies into the relationship between financial intermediaries and financial markets
are discussed in Chapter 2, where both institutions coexist, and the economy faces
more than one exogenous shock at the same time and asymmetrical information
situations.
Another weakness of this chapter is that, by assuming a constant money supply,
it does not take into account how the monetary policy will affect portfolio decisions.
Chapter 3 discusses whether the expansionary monetary policy can affect the bank’s
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portfolio composition, and how the amount of liquidity held by the whole economy
is influenced when securitization is introduced.
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Chapter 2
A Swansong by Banks: Banking




Consumers facing uncertainties participate in asset markets to allocate their re-
sources over periods. If true asset prices are fully revealed in the market, they
can obtain efficient consumption allocation. However, if some of the consumers (as
known as uninformed consumers) facing uncertainty have access to only limited in-
formation, then informed consumers might exploit the uninformed and gain profits
by utilising their knowledge and influencing the prices systematically.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether uninformed consumers who
face uncertainty can prevent losses arising from asymmetric information by con-
structing a bank and operating it in a particular way. More specifically, I show
that bank runs may serve to communicate information across agents and, thus, en-
hance rather than thwart the efficiency of the allocations. Bank runs can be efficient
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because they reveal new information to uninformed investors and thus prevent in-
formed agents from affecting asset prices. This eventually makes asset prices be
determined by fundamentals.
For that, this chapter presents a theoretical model showing that financial in-
termediaries1 can play a special role, that of revealing information even without
investing resources in order to identify information when financial markets are im-
perfect. The role of banks as information producers under information asymmetries
has been discussed widely in the literature. What I mean by ‘information process-
ing’ in this chapter, however, is different from the concept the most related studies
are adopting. While this article shares some common features with standard mod-
els in that banks manage the problems resulting from asymmetric information,2 the
mechanism of processing or revealing information is quite different from them.
It is generally assumed that, for example, the production of information in the
market “will not be done efficiently or at least cost (Campbel and Kracaw, 1980,
p.881).” Thus, the studies dealing with banks facing information problem focus on
the need for those institutions to invest their resources in order to produce valuable
information. The seminal paper on this issue by Brealey et al. (1977), and Boyd
and Prescott (1986), for example, show that financial intermediaries can produce
reliable information which is only known to a borrower ex-ante and thus results in
an adverse selection problem.
The striking difference between these studies and mine is that the financial coali-
tion by agents in this model does not produce information deliberately by investing
some of its resources. The production of information is done efficiently without cost
throughout bank runs under certain conditions. Let me explain this result in an
intuitive way. Suppose there exist two kinds of uncertainties in the world: liquidity
preference shocks and shocks on illiquid assets’ return, both of which are assumed
1Financial intermediaries are defined as the voluntary coalition by agents in this chapter, and
intermediaries, coalitions are used interchangeably with ‘banks’.
2For example, financial intermediaries can provide efficient lending mechanisms when there exist
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. See Diamond (1984).
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to be known only to informed agents.3 Suppose also the informed agents can ma-
nipulate illiquid asset prices, which are determined endogenously and affected by
random shocks, only in a certain state of nature by adjusting the supply of and de-
mand for them. As a result, Uninformed consumers who participate in the market
suffer losses due to these distorted prices. To prevent these losses, the uninformed
form a bank, which makes a specific type of deposit contract with its members and
let it go bankrupt if a particular state of nature occurs. The existence of bank runs
itself reveals that a distinct state of nature happens (e.g., the fraction of uninformed
agents who are subject to preference shocks are revealed through bank runs), which
again makes them conjecture still unknown information (e.g., the rate of return on
illiquid assets) with accuracy. Now that the asymmetric information problem has
been resolved, they will be able to trade in the asset market without loss.
More specifically, uninformed agents form intermediaries, and each bank makes
a standard deposit contract promising a fixed amount of fiat money if she turns
out to be a mover at date t + 1. The bank, which maximises the ex-ante expected
utility of the typical uninformed agent, will hold only minimal fiat money hoping
the number of movers to be low. Then it goes bankrupt when the fraction of movers
is revealed higher than expected. Even though agents’ relocation shocks are private
information, the happening of bank runs itself will disclose the information that the
fraction of movers is high. Once the uninformed agents acquire this information,
they know that the true prices of illiquid assets will be revealed. Thus, they can
exchange their assets with others without suffering the loss caused by asymmetric
information, in accordance with their true liquidity preferences. This process shows
one of the functions banking serves as information processor by allowing for bank
runs.
In the process of motivating the rationale for the existence of financial interme-
diation, information-asymmetric problems of the uninformed agents are solved in
relation to informed agents. I argue that under asymmetric information and lim-
3Therefore, there are four possible states of nature, and hence four different forms of asset
prices.
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ited participation in financial markets, bank runs (or bankruptcy) may help agents
to achieve an efficient allocation since bank runs can make hidden information re-
vealed, to which only a fraction of agents in the economy are assumed to have access.
Therefore, the financial intermediaries in this model not only serve the standard role
of liquidity provision, which has been widely studied since the 1980s pioneered by
Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), but also have an alternative justi-
fication based on information processing when the economy faces uncertainty.
This chapter also provides a new ground for the coexistence of banks and financial
markets. Even when all the agents deposit their whole endowment goods with
the bank, financial intermediaries and markets coexist once (efficient) bank runs
happen. The scale of banks under asymmetric information and limited participation
in relation to financial markets are also considered. Allowing a run implies that the
scale of the banking sector is minimized to the lower fraction of consumers who face
liquidity shocks, and thus potentially increase welfare.
The model in this chapter assumes that the financial market is imperfect due to
informational asymmetries and limited participation. I follow assumptions used in
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) to model information asymmetry and Diamond (1997)
for introducing the effect of limited participation in financial markets and interme-
diation. This chapter, however, provides a different rationale for the coexistence of
markets and banks because of the possibility of a run. Moreover, Diamond (1997)
assumes that all assets pay a rate of return that is known with complete certainty
and, thus, has not considered the effects of uncertainty on the equilibrium and the
possibility of bank runs, which are dealt with importance in this chapter.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) present a model explaining how financial interme-
diaries arise endogenously and how security contracts are made when uninformed
agents, facing asymmetric information, need to transact. Informed agents can ex-
ploit the uninformed by their superiority in information4. Facing this problem,
4They used the standard three-period model as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Uninformed
agents are endowed with 1 unit of capital good at their initial period and consumption good at their
middle period. Agents who are subject to liquidity shocks become early consumers. The trade
between early and later consumers is made in imperfect financial markets where early consumers
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uninformed agents form a coalition to protect themselves from losses and let it issue
debt and equity simultaneously. Throughout this arrangement, financial intermedi-
aries ‘can attract informed agents to hold equity and uninformed agents to hold debt
which they then use for trading purposes (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990, p.50)’ if the
number of informed agents is sufficiently larger than that of uninformed agents. In
this way, ‘the existence of our intermediary does not rely on providing risk-sharing
or resolving inefficient interruption of production. Our notion of liquidity as pro-
viding protection from insiders is fundamentally different (Gorton and Pennacchi,
1990, p.51).’ It seems that Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) implicitly concludes that
financial intermediaries dominate markets if certain conditions are met.5
For some similarities between Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and mine, there are
some significant differences. In Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), the institution resolves
the problem on asymmetric information by providing different bespoke assets with
uninformed and informed agents respectively, irrespective of the information struc-
ture. In this chapter, however, the bank just plays the standard role of providing risk
sharing with consumers. The mechanism through which the intermediary reveal the
information asymmetries to the uninformed, unlike Gorton and Pennacchi (1990),
is a simple standard deposit contract allowing bank runs to occur under certain
circumstances. Moreover, both institutions coexist unlike Gorton and Pennacchi
(1990).
Unlike the traditional costly bank runs,6 one of the conclusions in this article is
that a bank run is an efficient phenomenon in certain circumstances. The literature
sell their capital good in return for consumption goods from late consumers. Their results are
valid in this chapter in that the informed agents exploit the uninformed agents systematically
when markets have information asymmetries. The difference in environment between Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990) and this chapter is that this article takes (i) the OLGs model having two separate
islands, (ii) agents are subject to relocation shocks, (iii) consumers use fiat money as liquid assets
the rate of return of which is not fixed but determined in the interaction between the old and the
young, and (iv) endowment goods are only available at agents’ initial period. These are explained
in detail in Sec 2.4.2.
5For details on the relationship between markets and banks, see Thesis Introduction and Chap-
ter 1.
6For the recent studies on costly bank runs, see Martin et al. (2014), Angeloni and Faia (2013),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), and Gertler et al. (2016).
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dealing with efficient bank runs deals with information based runs.7 They focus on
the fact that bank runs are the reflection of the business cycle, and they come from
agents’ optimising behaviour expecting the poor performance of the banks rather
than from the result of sunspots.
The related literature with this chapter is Allen and Gale (1998). According to
Allen and Gale (1998), bank runs could be efficient in the case where a standard
deposit contract cannot be made contingent on the ‘leading economic indicator’, such
as the return on illiquid assets, which yields a random return. A bank run makes
consumption contingent on the state of nature. The indicator can be observed with
accuracy at the middle period and thus, ‘the possibility of equilibrium bank runs
allows banks to hold the first-best portfolio and produces just the right contingencies
to provide first-best risk sharing (p.1250).’ No information problem arises at least at
a time when bank runs actually happen in Allen and Gale (1998) since each agent
can observe the indicator with precision by assumption.8 Bank runs happen, in
this chapter, however, irrespective of whether agents have access to the information
about the rate of return on risky asset. In other words, banks runs may happen
even when the higher rate of return on illiquid assets is expected. And the run
is efficient not because it makes contingent consumption possible but because it
reveals the unknown information to which uninformed agents do not have access.
The studies I reviewed until now share one common feature; those papers all deal
with the economy focused on real factors in which a role for currency is ignored.
Champ et al. (1996), on the other hand, constructs a monetary model in which a
role for currency is considered and monetary factors play a specific role in banking
panics. In Champ et al. (1996), the bank provides insurance with agents who have
random needs for liquidity because of the possibility of relocation. The ‘relocation
shock’ takes the place of ‘preference shock’ in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). One
7The related papers are Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen
and Gale (1998), and Diamond and Rajan (2001), just to name a few.
8In a similar vein, Gorton (1985) provides a model where agents obtain, at the middle period,
some information regarding the rate of return on risky asset of which expected value is realized at
the final period.
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of the reasons why they consider it seriously is because the defining fractures of
banking distress involve the currency in a central way. Except assumptions used in
the basic set-up of the model (three-period OLGs model with relocation shock where
fiat money is used as liquid assets), this chapter, however, is not directly related to
the Champ et al. (1996).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The environment is described in
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 the process of asset price determination is shown in detail.
In Section 2.4 the asset market equilibrium with and without asymmetric informa-
tion is described. Then, in Section 2.5 the financial intermediary is introduced and
considers how the intermediary deals with the problems regarding the asymmetric
information. In Section 2.6, I show that financial intermediaries are still needed
when we introduce another friction into financial markets, limited participation,
even though each agent has access to the perfect information. And then, I consider
an economy, having both asymmetric information and the limited participation, and
study the role of banks. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 2.7.
2.2 Environment and Behaviour of Agents
There9 are infinitely many overlapping generations of agents who live for three pe-
riods (call them young-middle-old respectively). The population in this economy is
equally divided by two distinct locations– two different islands. At the middle of
each period stochastic relocation shocks occur and a fraction of movers among unin-
formed agents, λi, is relocated to the different island at the end of the same period
and will spend her final period on the island. λi is assumed to take two different
values: λh, with probability µh, or λ
l, with probability µl, where 0 < λ
l < λh < 1.
The probability of relocation is assumed to be the same across both islands so that
the population in each island remains constant.10 There are two different types of
9The model in this section where only financial markets exist is based on models by Champ
et al. (1996), Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Diamond (1997). Champ et al. (1996) built an
OLGs model with random relocation where agents live for two periods.
10If there were no aggregate relocation shocks, there were large numbers of uninformed agents,
and their relocation shocks are assumed to be independent, the fraction of movers is equal to the
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assets for savings: capital and fiat money. The capital is an illiquid asset for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the capital invested in production needs two periods of time before it
transformed into consumption goods. Secondly, it is assumed not to be transported
across islands, and moreover, due to the ‘limited communication’, claims against
capital is assumed to be useless. For movers to consume after being relocated, they
need fiat money which is identical in the two islands and universally accepted as a
means of exchange.
2.2.1 Agents











Figure 2.1: Types of Agents
Agents are divided broadly into two groups: the informed and the uninformed.
The measure of the entire set of uninformed agents in each island is normalised to
the unit interval [0, 1], and the fraction of informed agents in terms of the scale of
the uninformed is denoted as λinf . Thus, in each island, 1 + λinf number of agents
live.
Each uninformed agents are subject to random relocation shocks when they are
middle age. After learning they should move, movers are relocated to the other
island at the beginning of date t+2 (at the beginning of their old). Before they are
relocated, they trade their holdings of capital for fiat money in a financial market.
They exchange this accumulated money with consumption goods from the new-born
young (or the coalition of the young if any) at date t+2. The informed are assumed
probability of being a mover according to the Law of Large Numbers.
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not to be subject to the relocation shocks and thus stay on the same island. Another
difference between the informed and the uninformed is that informed agents have
access to the information whether the rate of return on capital would be high or
low, and the fraction of movers, who belong to the same generation as them, is large
or small when they are in the middle age (at date 1).
Agents, who are turned out to stay on the home islands, exchange some or all
of their holdings of money with capital the movers hold. They consume the return
from any capital investment made when young, and the capital they bought from
movers when middle, plus consumption goods, for which they trade any fiat money
holdings (if any left) with the newly born young at t + 2. The timing of events is
illustrated in Figure 2.
t t+1 t+2
- The initial old trade 
their currency for 
goods with the 
young.
- The young form 










- Asset market is 
held.






- Movers trade their 
currency for goods 
with the young.
Figure 2.2: Timing of Events
The nonmovers are classified again into two subgroups. The fraction among
nonmovers, α(1 − λi), born at date t and called type A, have access to a financial
market at date t+ 1. On the other hand, the fraction of (1− α)(1− λi) is assumed
not to join the market. Thus, α can be used as an index to show financial market
development as in Diamond (1997). Except for the possibility of participating in
the market, there are no essential differences between types A and B. The fraction
of type B, (1 − α)(1 − λi), is assumed to be zero in this section, Section 2.4 and
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2.5. The effect of the existence of type B on the role and scale of banking will be
discussed in detail in Section 2.6.
2.2.2 Preferences
All agents are risk-neutral and consume at their final period. The reason why we
taking linear utility function is for calculating a closed-form solution of the optimiz-
ing agent. Uninformed agents, who are born at time t, are ex-ante identical and
individually observe relocation shocks at the middle of date t+1. This information
is privately held and not observable by other agents.11 Preferences of the generation





cinf,t+2, if the informed
where cτ,t+2 denotes the amount of good that is consumed in the final period of life
by a type of τ born in period t.
2.2.3 Endowments and Technology
Each agent is born with one unit of endowment goods, which can be used both for
consumption and investment and cannot be stored from one period to the next. En-
dowments are used to form a portfolio consisting of two types of assets: fiat money,
M and capital, k. Each agent born at date t chooses to allocate her endowment
into qt and kt to maximise her expected utility.
12 Let vt be the value of 1 unit of
11If this information can be observed by anyone living on the island, the information problem
is removed. Movers deal only with nonmovers and nonmovers only with movers. Also, with ‘open
communication’, where the claims against the capital can be verified costless and can be traded
without cost, all agents will only hold capital since its rate of return is expected to be greater than
that of fiat money. The next footnote explains that such an equilibrium is not possible.
12If agents are risk-averse, they will both acquire fiat money and capital even though the rate of
return on capital is expected to be higher than that of currency. If agents are assumed to be risk-
neutral, all might want to hold only capital. If financial markets take place in the middle period of
their life, however, at least some should keep some fiat money for trades to occur. Some fraction
of agents who are turned out to be a mover will try to sell their holdings of capital. However,
since no one holds money, the asset price will go to zero. Thus, there will be at least some agents
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fiat money in terms of goods at time t. Then qt(≡ vtMt) denotes the real demand
for fiat money at date t. Uninformed agents will save some of their endowment in
the form of currency despite its lower rate of return than its alternative (capital)
because some of them are subject to relocation shocks. Thus, two different forms
of savings–fiat money and capital–are not regarded as perfect substitutes to each
other.
All uninformed agents are homogeneous ex-ante and decide how to divide their
savings between currency and capital with their one unit of endowment goods at
the beginning of their first period (at date t). Their budget constraint is given as
qt + kt = 1
kt units of investment at date t yields Rjkt
13 units of output at date t + 2, and
Rj is a random variable taking two different values: RH , with probability ρH ,
14
or RL, with probability ρL where RH > RL > 0. Even though vt and vt+1 is
determined endogenously within the model, the rate of return on fiat money is just
equal to 1 if money supply is assumed to remain constant and two different islands
are symmetric.15 E[Rj] is assumed to be greater than two periods rate of return
on fiat money,16 v2/v0, i.e., it is assumed that E[Rj] > v2/v0. It is also assumed
that RH > v2/v0 > RL, i.e., the rate of return on capital could be lower than that
of fiat money when the random return is low. The assumption on technology is
who might want to hold currency to exploit this arbitrage opportunity. In this section, agents are
assumed to hold both fiat money and currency for this reason, i.e., in equilibrium both qt > 0 and
kt > 0.
13The linear capital production technology was introduced into the overlapping generations
model by Cass and Yaari (1966) and the assumption is widely used in the literature.
14For simplicity I assume that the probability of each possible rate of return on capital is equal
as ρL = ρH = 1/2.
15In this chapter, I consider stationary and symmetric allocation only, so I drop the time scripts
t from now on. The consumption of agents born at date t is written as cτ,2, and the value of fiat
money at date t + s is denoted as vs for all s ≥ 0. The notations without time subscript denote
the amount determined at date t = 0.
16Thus, the fiat money is used for both medium of exchange and store of values in this model.
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> RL > 0
2.2.4 Money Market Equilibrium
No one in the future generations is born with fiat money. For young agents to
acquire fiat money per each island, they must trade with the initial old living on
the same island with them who are endowed in total with M units of fiat money at
date t. The initial value of fiat money, v0, is determined at the beginning of period
t by the coincidence of the demand for fiat money by the young and the supply of
it by the initial old.17 The (real) demand for fiat money (the number of goods each
young agent chooses to sell for fiat money) is given as:
DM = (λi + (1− λi))q = q
The supply of fiat money measured in goods comes from the initial old.
SM = v0M





In a stationary equilibrium where the money supply is constant,18 all generations
face the same decision problem. Therefore, q and thus v have constant values, i.e.,
17The initial middle-aged agents, holding both currency and capital at date t, are assumed not
to participate in this market since the market takes place before the relocation shocks are revealed.
Under this assumption, the initial middle have no incentive to change their portfolio.
18This assumption cannot be sustained in situations where each island faces different idiosyn-
cratic relocation shocks, or where monetary authorities play an active role to affect the economy
by adjusting the money supply. If the two separate islands had a different fraction of movers, then
the population of each island would be distinct from each other and thus, will have dynamic effects
on consumption and the value of money after their relocation. The effect of these incidents on
equilibria will be discussed in the further study.
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vt+s = v for all s ≥ 0.
2.2.5 Movers
A consumer, who is turned out to be a mover at her middle age (at date 1), sells her
entire holdings of capital at a price B1 before she moves. She inelastically supplies
her capital holdings, whatever the price is. The total unit of currency the mover





The second term of the preceding equation denotes the amount of fiat money
the mover acquires by selling her capital to nonmovers who belongs to the same














B1k = q +B1k (2.3)
The consumption depends on agents’ portfolio decision and the price of an illiquid
asset at date 1, B1.
2.2.6 Nonmovers
Non-movers must decide to trade either some or all of their holdings of fiat money
for illiquid assets (capital) at date t+1 weighing the difference between the expected
returns of the two assets, unlike movers facing a trivial decision problem whether
to sell their capital or not. So, the total supply of fiat money (SM) by nonmovers,
which equals to the demand for capital, DK , takes the following form.
SM = DK = (1− λi)γM
where γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) is the ratio of cash reserves exchanged with capital. γ = 1
implies that nonmovers trade their whole currency for capital at date t + 1 and do
Chapter 2.2. ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOUR OF AGENTS 69
Essays on Banking and Finance



























Rj + (1− γ)q
(2.4)
2.3 Determination of Asset Prices and Equilib-
rium
This section contains a detailed exposition on how the price of capital, an illiquid and
risky asset, is determined when the economy faces uncertainty on the fundamentals.
This discussion is based on the work of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Allen and Gale
(1994), and Diamond (1997), which discuss the process of asset price determination
in different situations.
2.3.1 Fundamental Asset Price
Assume that an asset market at date 1 is held after the relocation shocks are revealed
and before movers are relocated. Let Bi,j1 be the (nominal) price of one unit of capital
traded in the asset market at date 1 facing uncertainties. i and j denote the state














Proof See Appendix 2-1.
The proposition tells us that if the market has enough liquidity (i.e.,SM > DM),
then the asset price would reach its highest possible point,
Rj
v2/v1
. However, if the
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market suffers liquidity shortage for any reason, the price will be determined by the
amount of cash supplied. This is known as ‘cash-in-the-market pricing’ in which the
asset price is determined as the ratio of total available ‘cash’ to the amount of asset
provided (Allen and Gale, 1994, 2009).
2.3.2 Asset Prices with Uncertainties
Proposition 2.3.2 Suppose that the random variable Rj takes on the value of RH
with probability of ρH and RL with probability of ρL, where RH > RL > 0, and all




h, with probability µh
λl, with probability µl,
where 0 < λl < λh < 1.
Then the capital prices at date 1 facing uncertainties, Bi,jt , have the following
relationship:












which is strictly greater than v1
v0






strictly less than v1
v0
. (i = {h, l}).
















3. In the equilibrium we have
Bl,H1 > B
h,H
1 > v1/v0 > B
i,L
1 (2.6)
















Bl,L1 = RL (2.7)
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Proof See Appendix 2-2.








, the asset price
in this section cannot be higher than the fundamental value, pt+1Rj. The market
always undergoes “underpricing” (Allen and Gale, 1994).19
Assumption 5 When the economy has large fraction of movers, i.e., when λi = λh,
then the asset price is determined by the amount of liquidity in the market.
When the economy suffers high liquidity needs which implies less provision of liq-
uidity by relatively lower numbers of nonmovers, the asset price is assumed to deter-
mined by the ‘cash-in-the-market’. This assumption is needed to calculate the exact
amount of capital provided to the market by informed agents (See Proposition 2.4.1).
Corollary 2.3.3 Applying the previous assumption, we have the following relation-
















Formally, a imperfectly competitive rational expectations equilibrium for agents
born at date t = 0 consists of









2. The vectors of the value of fiat money: v0 = v1 = v2 = v
3. The expected consumption of agents:
EA[Cτ,2] =
 E[λ
icm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]
E[cinf,2]
19Asking if the asset price always takes the value less than the fundamental value is questioning
whether ‘bubbles’ may exist or not. This is an interesting question but is not dealt with in
this article. See Prize (2013) for an introductory description of whether financial assets reflect
fundamental values or bubbles exist.
72Chapter 2.3. DETERMINATION OF ASSET PRICES AND EQUILIBRIUM
Essays on Banking and Finance
where E[λicm,2 + (1 − λ
i)cn,2] denotes the expected utility of the uninformed
agent.
4. A specification of storage strategies for (market participating) nonmovers: γL,
where 0 < γL ≤ 1.
5. A specification of insider coalition strategies : λi,jinf (discussed in detail in
Section 2.4.2).
such that,
1. Agents’ respective utilities are maximised (E[cτ,2] maximises agent τ ’s ex-
pected utility)
2. {Bi,j1 } and γ clear the asset market in all states of {i, j}, where i = {l, h} and
j = {L,H}.
3. λi,jinf is self-enforcing.
2.4 Market Equilibrium
2.4.1 Full Participation & Complete Information
Let B̂i,j1 be the full-information prices of an illiquid asset for states {i, j} which is
determined from Proposition 2.3.2. And let EF [λicm,2 + (1 − λ
i)cn,2] be expected
utility of uninformed agents with full information and full participation, then EF [·]
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is given as:20






























































































= q + E[Rj]k
(2.8)
Lines between the second and fifth in (2.8) represents the consumption level
when each state {i, j} happens. In what follows, I study how the expected welfare
of each type is affected when consumers have asymmetric information.
2.4.2 Markets with Asymmetric Information
As before,21 movers sell their holdings of capital, k, regardless of the realized states
of nature, while nonmovers need to decide whether to store fiat money or to trade
all or some units of currency for capital. Only informed agents have access to the
information at date t + 1 on the precise returns on capital, Rj, and the proportion
of movers, λi, which will be known to the uninformed at date t+ 2 .
Informed agents hold only capital at date 0 since they know that they are not
relocated. Then the total amount of capital informed agents’ holding at date t is
simply λinf , where λinf is the relative proportion of informed agents with respect
to the uninformed. The informed form a coalition at date 1 after the uncertainty is
revealed. The coalition collectively decides whether to provide capital of its members
20See the appendix 2-3 for computational details.
21This section is based on Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and closely follows their assumptions
and shows similar results. As they point out, the informed may exploit uninformed agents and
systematically benefit at the expense of them when prices are not fully revealing.
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holding in a state {i, j}, where i = {h, l} and j = {H,L} to the market. Let λi,jinf be
the amount (proportion) of capital the coalition decides to provide with the financial
market at date t + 1, where 0 ≤ λi,jinf ≤ λinf . The question posed in this situation
is: will λi,jinf be positive in some information sets {i, j} at date t+ 1? The coalition
will trade capital for fiat money only when they get additional gains from the trade
by manipulating the asset price by providing its holdings of capital. The following
proposition22 shows when that arbitrage opportunity is possible.
Proposition 2.4.1 • Let R¯ = µ′hRH + µ
′
lRL denote the informed nonmover’s
posterior expectation on the rate of return on capital when the state {l, L}
happens, and µ′h and µ
′
l are their posterior probabilities on the fraction of
movers.








, and (ii) the number of informed agents compared to that of the unin-
formed is equal or greater than λinf ≥ λinf =
k[λh−λl]
1−λh
, then the coalition of
informed agents can mimic the price B̂h,H1 at date t + 1 when the state {l, L}
happens. Let B˜l,L1 be the price which is manipulated by the informed agents






λinf is the minimal size of the informed to influence the asset price. Unin-
formed nonmovers trade their whole fiat money for capital because they misun-
derstand that the state {h,H} has occurred when they observe B˜l,L1 , and thus
γl = 1.
• Except for the state of {l, L}, the true prices are revealed as in Proposition 2.3.2
and λi,jinf = 0, where {i, j} 6= {l, L}.
22This proposition is a variant of Proposition 1 of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). We modified
it for the OLGs model with random relocation and fiat money.
Chapter 2.4. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 75
Essays on Banking and Finance
Proof See Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) to see how the informed agents manipulate
the asset price when a state {l, L} occurs to make it looks like B̂h,H1 .
Let B˜i,j1 be the asymmetric-information price for states {i, j} when λ
i,j
inf > 0.
Now, let us look at how much capital is provided by the coalition of the informed.
Let λl,Linf be the amount of capital supplied to the market by the coalition in the
state of {l, L}. The specific λl,Linf value can be obtained from the market equilibrium












The left-hand side of the preceding equation denotes the total supply of capital in the
state of {l, L}, and the right hand side of it is the demand for capital. Substituting
(1−λh)q
λhk
for kB˜l,L1 (= kB̂
h,H
1 ) using Assumption 5, and in the stationary equilibrium









h) = (1− λl)λhk − λl(1− λh)k
⇔λl,Linf (1− λ





As long as λinf ≥ λinf =
k[λh−λl]
1−λh
, the coalition of the informed is able to it can
mimic the price B̂h,H1 when a state {l, L} actually occurs. 
The preceding proposition implies that when the state {l, L} actually happens,


















Now let EA[λicm,2 + (1 − λ
i)cn,2] denote the expected utility of the uninformed
agents with asymmetric information, then EA[·] is given as
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Since the difference between eqs (2.8) and (2.10) exists only when the state {l, L}
happens, we have the following:
EF [λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]−E




















(B̂h,H1 −RL) > 0
(2.11)
The preceding equation tells us that EA[·] is always lower than EF [·] when asym-
metric information exists (See Appendix 2-4 for the detailed computation).
Finally, look at the expected utility of the informed agents. Under full informa-
tion where trades only occurs at true prices, the expected utility of the informed is
just
EF [cinf,2] = E[Rj]
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per unit of the capital good at
date t + 1 at a higher price, B˜l,L1 = B̂
h,H
1 , when a state {l, L} happens. This
gain comes from at the expense of consumption by nonmovers. Trading losses by
uninformed agents associated with information asymmetry is equal to the trading
gains by informed agents.23 The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.2 The imperfectly competitive rational expectations (temporary)
equilibrium with asymmetric information and without a coalition of the uninformed
young is given as











2. The expected consumption of agents:
EA[Cτ,2] =
 E
A[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] < E
F [λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]












3. The specification of storage strategies for (market participating) nonmovers:
 0 < γ < 1, when a state {h, L} happens.γ = 1, otherwise.





, if {i, j} = {l, L}
0, otherwise.
2.5 Forming a Bank
Now suppose that young, uninformed agents who are born at date t can organize
an institution, which is called a bank, and see if the institution can protect them-
23Since there are λl,Linf number of informed agents with respect to that of the uninformed agents
(which is normalized to 1), total gains from trade of informed agents is exactly equal to the total
loss by uninformed agents.
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selves from the loss induced by asymmetric information. They deposit some or all
of their endowment goods with a bank, and it uses the proceeds to acquire assets in
favour of its members. Free entry into the banking industry forces banks to compete
by offering deposit contracts that maximise the expected utility of consumers. In
dealing with bank runs situation, I follow the assumptions in Allen and Gale (1998)
rather than ‘sequential service’ assumption in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The
bank makes a standard deposit contract with its members. The contract promises a
nominal amount of fiat money, d, at date 1 if it has enough liquid assets. If the bank
does not have enough liquid assets to make the promised amount, however, it pays
out all available liquid assets and capital, divided equally among those withdrawing.
2.5.1 The Model
At the beginning of time 0, the uninformed young deposit their endowment goods
to a bank in exchange for a promised amount of fiat money at date 1 if they turn
out to be movers. If they are nonmovers they become residual claimants and share
whatever left over equally with other nonmovers. Then, the bank’s problem is to
choose how much capital and fiat money to acquire to maximise the ex-ante expected




Ψ = E[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] (2.13)











(iv) cn,2 ≥ cm,2 = v2d
(2.14)
24To make the transaction sequence as simple as possible I assume the initial old at date 0 and
old movers after date 1 consume after the coalition accepts deposits from the young uninformed.
Chapter 2.5. FORMING A BANK 79
Essays on Banking and Finance
The first constraint is the budget constraint facing a bank.25 The bank determines
how to divide its member’s endowment goods between liquid and illiquid assets.
The second decision made by the bank is about how much it should pay to
movers who must withdraw at date 1. The bank makes a standard deposit contract
with its members. The contract promises to give a fixed amount of fiat money, d,
at date 126 by paying out all available liquid assets, divided equally among those
withdrawing. Movers withdrawing d at date 1 consume v2d at date 2. If the bank
does not have enough liquid assets to make the promised amount to movers at date
1, the bank will go bankrupt. The constraint (ii) says that the bank’s holding of fiat
money must be sufficient to provide movers with d according to deposit contracts.
Non-movers are paid whatever is available at their third period which is shown in
constraint (iii). The constraint (iii) says that the consumption of nonmovers are
limited by the total value of the risky asset, capital, plus the amount of fiat money
left over after the movers are paid off, if any.
The constraint (iv), which denotes incentive compatibility constraint, says that
consumption by nonmovers must be at least as much as that of movers. Movers
will withdraw their deposits in forms of fiat money from the bank at their middle
age before they are relocated and then take the money to the bank in the foreign






Non-movers will get whatever left over in a bank when they are old. Since whether
a certain agent is relocated or not is private information, and thus, the bank cannot
identify who is a mover and who is a nonmover, nonmovers have an incentive to
pretend to be a mover unless this constraint holds. The incentive constraint tells us
that nonmovers do not have any incentive to pretend to be a mover as long as they
would get a higher level of the consumption good at their final period.
25In this section I suppose each uninformed young agent deposits her whole endowment goods
when she is young. However, we do not necessarily need to assume this way. For example, agents
may decide to hold capital directly and deposit only part of the endowment goods in the bank.
Diamond (1997) explains this type of deposit agreement. I will consider how the lower bound of
banking is changed under different assumptions applying the study of Diamond (1997).
26qi/v0 denotes the amount of fiat money the bank holds at date t+ 1.
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In the optimum, λid must be equal to qi/v0, otherwise (i.e., λ
id < qi/v0) the
bank could increase expected utility by reducing q because the rate of return on
capital is expected to be higher than that of fiat money. Note that a contingent
deposit contract is not possible to make because the portfolio decision is made
before relocation shocks are revealed. Since there are two possible states about the











If the bank chooses to spend qh instead of ql, and if a state l actually happens, it
will have excess liquidity which is passed over to the next period. On the other hand,
if the real money demand is equal to ql rather than qh and the state h happens,
then it will experience the shortage of liquidity and suffers bankruptcy.
2.5.2 Equilibrium
As noted in the preceding subsection, the optimal amount of q is not determined
as a fixed amount because the optimal q does not take a single value and depends
on how many agents are subject to the relocation shocks. Therefore, regarding
the bank’s choice of how much to pay to movers, there exist two possible choices
between ql and qh.27 Whether qi is the optimal amount of liquidity banks hold
depends on the realization of λi as shown in (2.15) and (2.16). Now let us consider
the effect of the bank’s two different choices on its members’ utility. The analysis
shows that the uninformed young will enjoy higher consumption level when the bank
spends a minimum on purchasing liquid assets at date t. In other words, the bank
always chooses ql instead of qh. Note that, however, in any case, the welfare of the
27In a situation where bank runs are costly, in that physical liquidation incurs cost (Allen and
Gale, 2000), or individuals do not have access to financial markets. In the latter case, not allowing
bank runs by holding enough liquidity can be optimal. Allen et al. (2009) takes this position.
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uninformed is increased when they form a bank.
Equilibrium with Bankruptcy
Suppose that the bank makes a contract with its depositors expecting the state l
would happen and holds liquid assets such that ql = λl, i.e., the bank determines to
sell minimal goods for fiat money. There is a good reason for choosing ql = λl. In
fact, with linear utility function, the expected utility of the uninformed agents will
be greater the less q is. However, if ql < λl the bank always suffers bankruptcy, and
so the bankruptcy’s unique role of revealing unknown states of nature is no longer
being performed.28
The bank’s choice of how much to spend to retain liquid assets has two conse-
quences, depending on how the actual state of nature i is realized. If the state l
happens at date t + 1, then the bank will hold sufficient amount of fiat money to
distribute it to movers. The expected consumption level by each agent is given as















Carrying over fiat money to date 2, i.e., cm,2 < v2d, is not optimal because the
bank can increase the consumption of nonmovers by reducing q without affecting
the consumption of movers. Therefore, in the optimal plan, the bank always choose
q and thus d such that






28In the standard Diamond and Dybvig type model with log utility, the optimal amount of q is
just equal to λ. See Chapter 1. Another reason why banks must have at least λl in liquidity is
that there might be liquidity regulation by central banks. However, the issue of regulation of the
central bank on liquidity or capital is not the subject of this paper, so we will not discuss it any
further.
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If the state h happens at date 1, on the other hand, then the bank will not hold
enough liquidity to be provided with movers since λhd > q
l
v0
= λld. The bank goes
bankrupt (bank runs happens) inevitably. If bank runs happen, then movers and
nonmovers equally divide the fiat money and capital the bank hold, ql + kl, and
movers and nonmovers trade these assets in financial markets with one another.
From the fact that bank runs happen, the agent now can realize that the state h
occurs instead of the state l. From this newly acquired knowledge, they can confine
the remaining possible asset prices into two distinct cases. In other words, they
know the only viable remaining states of nature will be either {h,H} or {h, L},
both of which cases the true values of asset prices are expected to be revealed (see
Proposition 2.4.1). So, nonmovers can trade their holdings of fiat money for capital
without risk incurred by asymmetric information.
B̂h,L1 is always equal to RL. Note that, however, the asset price in the state of
{h,H} takes a different form from that in (??). The bank has chosen ql but since a







The different asset price in the state {h,H} does not affect the expected utility of
the uninformed agent since the agents are assumed to be risk-neutral.
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Substituting (2.17), (2.18), (2.20), and (2.21) into the objective function (2.13),
and assuming constant money supply, we can calculate expected utility of the un-
informed agents.












































where El[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] is expected utility of uninformed agents when agents
organize a bank and the bank chooses ql. Losses that occur under asymmetric
information do not occur in this situation,29 and thus, the uninformed agents have
higher expected utility than under asymmetric information.30
Equilibrium without Bankruptcy
Now suppose that the bank makes an alternative choice expecting the state h would
happen and hold qh = λh. In other words, the bank chooses q expecting the num-
ber of movers will be higher. There exist two possible scenarios according to the
realization of state i as in the previous subsection.
If the state h happens at date t+1, then the bank will hold sufficient amount of
29See Appendix 2-5 for the computational details.
30As long as ql is less than or equal to E[Rj ]k
l, the incentive constraint is met.
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fiat money to distribute to movers. Unlike the previous section, bank runs do not
occur even when the state h occurs. The expected consumption level by each agent
is given as









If the state l happens at date 1, then the bank holds excessive liquidity, which
is unintended when the bank first chooses its portfolio at date 0 amounting (qh −
λlv0d).
31




































The first term on the right hand side of cn,2, v2
[
d(λh − λl)], represents the
increased amount of consumption due to fiat money carried over from date 1 to
date 2. The second term, Rjk
h, is the consumption from illiquid assets. Note
that the expected consumption of nonmovers is lower than that in (2.18) because
the bank holds excessive fiat money than necessary and less capital (note that
kh = 1 − λh < 1 − λl = kl). This implies that inefficiency is caused by the bank’s
holding excessive liquidity at date 0. This inefficiency arises because the decision
by a bank is made at date 0, which expects the specific state i will happen, but a
different state actually happens at date 1.
Therefore, when the state l happens, the bank holding excessive liquidity at date
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is expected. Does it buy additional capital from the informed at date 1? It turns
out that it will never end up trading with informed because of the following reason.
By the fact that it holds excessive liquidity after movers’ withdrawing, the bank
now gets a new information that the state l happened instead of the state h. It
still does not know, nevertheless, the exact return on capital which will be realized
at date 2, which is known only to the informed. Now that the coalition acquires
the information about the total fraction of movers, it knows that the possible asset
prices will be confined only to two distinct cases. i.e., it knows only remaining
possible states of nature are {i, j} = {l, H} or {l, L}. It also knows that informed
agents will try to sell their capital only when the returns on capital is low, i.e., only
in the state of {l, L} (see Proposition 2.4.1). The financial market now can be seen
as “the market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). The bank chooses to keep the currency
to the next period, and thus, trades in the financial market are not made at date
t+ 1. The uninformed agents will consume according to (2.23) and (2.24).
Substituting (2.23) and (2.24) into the objective function (2.13), and letting
Eh[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] denote the expected utility of the uninformed agents when
the bank chosses qh, we have32






















The second term in the third line of the preceding equation is calculated using λl = ql
and λh = qh. Losses that occur under asymmetric information do not occur when
the bank chooses qh as well. However, the expected utility with ql is greater than
32The constant money supply is assumed as well.
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that with qh because from (2.22) and (2.25)
El[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]− E
h[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]
= (qh − ql)(E[Rj]− 1) > 0
(2.26)
Therefore, the coalition will always choose q∗ = λl rather than q∗ = λh.
I showed that the coalition of uninformed agents can effectively eliminate the
loss due to asymmetric information by allowing a run and thus revealing the true
prices of capital. Also note that financial markets and banks coexist after a bank
run occurs.
I assumed until now that all uninformed young agents deposit their whole en-
dowment with a bank at date t. However, the assumption is not necessarily needed.
Uninformed agents can deposit only parts of their endowment with a bank and hold
capital directly. Let the scale of banking be β, the fraction of endowment goods
deposited with a bank, then the lower bound on the date t scale of banking under
asymmetric information, βAI , is the amount of goods needed to buy fiat money
β ≥ βAI = λl. When β = λl, each agent directly hold the capital amounting to
1 − β. Summing up all the findings until now can be summarized as the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.5.1 The imperfectly competitive rational expectations equilibrium
when the uninformed young form a bank is given as
















2. The expected consumption of agents:
E[Cτ,2] =
 E
l[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] = q
l + klE[Rj]
El[cinf ] = E[Rj],
where ql = λl and kl = 1− λl.
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3. The specification of storage strategies for (market participating) nonmovers:
 γ < 1, in states of {i, L}γ = 1, in states of {i, H}, where i = {h, l}.
4. The specification of insider coalition strategies: λi,jinf = 0
5. The lower bound on the date 0 scale of banks: β ≥ βAI = ql = λl
6. Bank runs are inevitable and efficient when state {h, j} happens, where j =
{H,L}. Financial markets and banks coexist when the states {h, j} occurs
even when β = 1 (when uninformed agents deposit their whole endowments
with the bank).
2.6 Limited Participation in Markets & Imperfect
Information
Until this point, the analysis has assumed that uninformed agents have access to the
market without limitation. This section analyses an incomplete asset market caused
by asymmetric information and limited participation at the same time. Suppose
that only α fraction among nonmovers have access to financial markets. Then, the
total fraction of nonmovers participating in markets will be α(1 − λi) and that of
nonmovers who do not have access to a market will be (1− α)(1− λi).
Let B˘i,j1 be the price of an illiquid asset which would prevail with limited partic-












1 > 1 > RL = B˘
l,L = B˘h,L
(2.27)
The price in the state of {h,H}, under full information, B̂h,H1 , can be higher than
that in the state of {l, H} under imperfect information, B˘l,H1 , if the fraction of
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nonmovers who have access to the market is lower than some point, i.e.,
B˘l,H1 < B̂
h,H





As before, B˘l,H1 and B˘
h,H



















B˘1k = q + B˘1k




























Rj + (1− γ
i)q
The consumption of type B nonmovers at date t+ 2 is
cnB,2 = v2M + kRj =
v2
v0
q + kRj = q + kRj
It would be interesting to ask whether the uninformed young still would like to
form a coalition at date 0 with full-information but some of its members are isolated
from the market. The answer to the question is that the uninformed young will set
up a bank to minimise losses that could arise from some of them being excluded
from the market.
33As long as α < 1 and other things being equal, the money holding ratio γ tends to be bigger
than under full participation case. Due to the reduced demand for capital (because of the limited
participation), the asset prices in the state {i, L} could be lower than RL. The lower asset prices
will induce type B nonmovers, who used to hold some currency if all agents have access to markets,
want to trade more of their currency holdings for capital.
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[cm,2 + cA,2 + cnB,2] < q + E[Rj]k = E
F [cm,2 + cn,2], (2.28)
where EF
′
[·] denotes expected utility under full information and limited participa-
tion. Even though the calculation process is messy, the economic intuition behind
this result is straightforward. Limited participation in markets implies the type B
nonmovers end up holding inefficient liquidity assets, which is passed over from pe-
riod t+1 to period t+2 for consumption. Thus, the economy would keep excessive
liquidity than necessary eventually.
Total losses from this limited participation constraint are always greater than 0
as long as α < 1. This loss is a decreasing function of α and the maximum loss
incurred from limited participation happens when α = 0 (see Appendix 2-6 for
computational details.).
To address this problem, the young uninformed agents organize a bank at date
0. The role of a bank which maximises the expected utility of the uninformed young
is gathering the need for holding fiat money together and avoiding the inefficient
holdings of fiat money by type B nonmovers at date 1. The bank will minimize its
of fiat money holding as a fraction of movers λi.34
In the following, I will study the effects of characteristics of asymmetric infor-
mation and limited participation on equilibria dividing it into two parts. The first
deals with the resource allocation problem when there is only the asset market, and
the second analyses the case where the asset market and the bank are together.
Note that the results below will be quite different depending on whether α is
known to the uninformed agents or not. Moreover, the asset prices, which the
informed agents can mimic when the low rate of return on capital is expected,
depend on the magnitude of α. When α is small, the coalition of the informed can
manipulate any prices as it wishes. Therefore, the optimal level of q is not be given
34Since complete information is assumed here λi is not a random variable.
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as a single value if there exists limitation on market participation. Rather it will
depend on the magnitude of nonmovers who have access to the market, α. The
results will be also different from that in Section 2.5, where the optimal deposit
contract are made expecting the state l happens and choosing to give movers the
amount of fiat money, d, by holding a minimal fiat money. From now on, however,
I assume that the fraction of α is known to all agents and α is not low enough for
the coalition to mimic any price, and the price manipulation is possible only in the
state of {h,H} as in Section 2.5.
2.6.1 Market Equilibrium
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, type A nonmovers will not keep fiat money for the
consumption at date 2 when j = H (irrespective of the state of i), and some storage
happens when j = L, i.e., some storages will occur only in the states {h, L} or
{l, L}.
Let 0 ≤ λ˘i,jinf ≤ λinf be the amount (proportion) of capital the coalition decides
to provide with the financial market at date t + 1 when markets are imperfect. In
a state {l, L}, the coalition of the informed can mimic state {h,H} by selling their













This happens when all the agents including uninformed agents know the value of α
the fraction of whom have access to the markets.35
We can show that the coalition by informed agents can mimic the price B˘h,H1
(> B˘l,L1 ) at date 1 when the state {l, L} happens as we did in Proposition 2.4.1.
35If α is unknown to the uninformed, then the informed can mimic even B̂h,H1 , which is greater
than B˘h,H1 if their capital holding is big enough.
Chapter 2.6. LIMITED PARTICIPATION IN MARKETS & IMPERFECT
INFORMATION
91
Essays on Banking and Finance














The least fraction of informed agents compared to the uninformed, which is
























Note that λ˘l,Linf is the same with λ
l,L
inf in (2.9). The minimal number of informed
agents needed to manipulate the price is the same as in the full participation case.36
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the welfare of the informed agents become higher at
the expense of uninformed agents’ welfare.
2.6.2 Bank Equilibrium
The bank takes the similar step in optimising its depositors’ expected utility as in
Section 2.5. As analysed in Section 2.5, the bank faces two possible choices about
how much to invest for real money balances, q, at date 1. Following the same
approach as one used in Section 2.5, let us consider the effect of the bank’s two
different choices about q on its members’ utility. The analysis is summarized as the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.6.1 The Proposition 2.5.1 holds with limited participation when
agents have linear utility function.
Proof To prove the preceding proposition, I analyse two different possible cases of
a bank and see which behaviour will give higher consumption profile of uninformed
36As I mentioned before, this fraction can be changed a lot depending on the assumption regard-
ing α, and under certain situations, the existence of the informed agents might result in Pareto
improvement. However, these issues are not discussed in this chapter.
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as in Section 2.5.
Equilibrium with Bankruptcy
The bank makes a deposit contract expecting the state l to happen and chooses to
invest ql = λl for liquid assets and promises to give d = q
l
v0λl
to any person who
withdraw at date 1. This implies that the bank determines to sell the minimal
amount of goods for fiat money and hold as much as kl = 1− λl.
If the state l happens at date t+1, then the expected consumption level by each
agent is given as









If the state h happens at date t + 1, however, the bank goes bankrupt (bank
runs happen) because λhd > q
l
v0
= λld. If runs occur, then movers and nonmovers
equally divide the fiat money and capital the bank holding, ql+kl. Movers and type
A nonmovers will trade these assets in a financial market with one another. The
bank run itself instructs the uninformed agents that total fraction of movers is λh.
This information will confine the possible remaining states of nature to two distinct
cases: either {i, j} = {h,H} or {h, L}. We already show that the true asset prices
are expected to be revealed in both cases.









The Consumption of a mover, then, can be represented depending on the realized
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And the consumption of a type B nonmover:
{h, j} cnB,2 =
v2
v0
ql + klE[Rj] (2.35)
Type B nonmovers are not affected by the state of j since they do not have access
to the financial market.
Substituting (2.31), (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35) into the objective function (2.13),
and assuming constant money supply, we can calculate expected utility of the un-
informed agents as follows.37
El
′
























































[cm,2 + cn,2] denotes the uninformed agent’s expected utility with limited
market participation and asymmetric information when they formed a bank. The
preceding equation shows that the restriction on market participation does not affect
the uninformed agents’ welfare without reference to how big the parameter α is if
37See the Appendix 2-7 for computational details.
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they could form a bank. This rather weird result comes because of the assumption
that agents are all risk-neutral. Since the portfolio decision by the bank is made at
date t, their expected utility is the same as long as no loss occurs in trade in the
financial markets. Once we assume a standard, risk-averse preference, however, the
result might be different.
There will be no gap in consumption between type A and B nonmovers when
the state {h, L} happens. They all consume ql + klRL. However, when the state

















The first term on the left-hand side is the consumption of a type A nonmover and
the second term is a type B’s consumption in the state of {h,H}. Since RH > B¯
h,H
1 ,
the difference is always positive. This implies that the expected utility of nonmovers
will be lower if only limited fraction of nonmovers has access to markets. The loss
from limited participation is a decreasing function of α. If α were very low, then
allowing bank runs may not be efficient. Then, investing in liquid assets more in
order to avoid bank runs might enhance the uninformed agents’ welfare, which I do
not discuss further.
Equilibrium without Bankruptcy
The results are the same as in Sec 2.5.2. Thus,
Eh
′
[λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2] < E
l′ [λicm,2 + (1− λ
i)cn,2]
Therefore, as long as the agents are regarded as risk-neutral, the limitation on market
participation does not affect the optimal behaviour of banks.

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2.7 Conclusions
With asymmetric information and restriction in market participation, financial in-
termediaries can make the unknown information revealed without needing to invest
its resources in order to identify it by just allowing bank runs to occur. Then, unin-
formed agents make transactions each other knowing that the true asset prices are
available. In this way, financial intermediaries and markets coexist after banks go
bankruptcy. This mechanism of ‘a bank run first’ and ‘transactions in the market
second’, thus, enhance the expected utility of the uninformed, otherwise facing lower
expected consumption generated by information asymmetries. The arrangement of
bank’s achieving this goal is made through standard deposit contract. Without
restriction in market participation, i.e., when all uninformed agents have access to
financial markets, the intermediary would hold the minimal amount of goods for fiat
money expecting the lower fraction of movers to be realized. Thus, the scale of the
banking sector is minimized to the lower fraction of movers, λl. Even though there
exists restriction in accessing to the market among the uninformed, the lower bound
of banking scale remain the same as long as agents have risk-neutral preferences
and the parameter indicating the financial market development, α, is a common
knowledge.
This conclusion, however, might be limited when α is unknown to uninformed
agents or when α has very low value. Also, bank runs might be costly if we assume
the standard, strictly concave utility function because the type B nonmovers’ loss
due to the limited participation can be critical. Then, the optimal spending on liquid
assets would be increased to the level where bank runs does not happen, and the
spending will be the function of α. If the value is lower than the critical point, then
the intermediary will not allow bank runs to occur by holding more liquid assets
amounting to λh, even though it incurs some cost due to a lower rate of return on
fiat money. The lower bound of banking scale is higher than under full participation
case.
The conclusion might be also limited when we allow the rate of return on the
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risky asset to be a random variable having general probability density function,
f(R). Then the asset prices also take continuous values rather than discrete.
Moreover, this chapter is only concerned with a stationary allocation and a
constant money supply, and thus assumes that the rate of return on fiat money
is constant each period. If a central bank having authority to print money exists,
the rate of return on fiat money will be affected by the monetary policy, and this
potentially will change the bank’s portfolio decision and thus the behaviour of agents
and the intermediary.38 Another interesting question would be to ask that the central
bank is able to remove the inefficiency induced by an asymmetric information.
Also, I considered the symmetric allocation between islands. Each island faces
the same stochastic shocks, so the population of each island remains constant. What
would happen if the relocation shock is idiosyncratic across each island, and so the
population of each region changes as each region sends the small number of movers
and take large number of movers? Would there be contagion or systemic risk in
interbank markets? It is also important to know what will happen to the mutual
relations between the two regions, which have different financial market structures
or financial market developments, and whether financial exchange between these two
regions can bring systematic risks or contagion. These questions ask us to consider
the interbank markets between islands and to solve a general equilibrium problem.
Some of these questions is dealt with in the following chapter.
38I discuss this issues in the following Chapter 3.
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2-1 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Proof The supply of capital comes from movers. They inelastically supply their
holdings of illiquid assets, whatever the price is. So there is a vertical supply curve,
and the quantity supplied (the demand for money) is:
SK(= DM) = λik
The demand for illiquid assets comes from nonmovers. Nonmovers need to decide
whether to hold fiat money and pass it over to the next period. For the decision,
they compare the expected rate of return on fiat money with that of capital. Let
γ be the ratio of money exchanged with capital at date 1. Then, 1 − γ fraction
among their money holdings (q/v0) is passed over to the date 1. γ takes a value
between 0 and 1, and γ = 1 implies that nonmovers inelastically supply their whole
fiat money to the market. However, γ = 0 (all storage of fiat money) will not occur
in an equilibrium since as γ → 0, Bi,jt → 0. So, as long as Rj > 0 there exists fiat
money provider to trade for illiquid assets.
One unit of fiat money will purchase 1/Bi,j1 units of claim on consumption goods
at date 1, and this will produce Rj/B
i,j
1 units of consumption goods at date 2. One
unit of the good is traded for 1/v1 units of fiat money at date 1 and this will purchase




Bi,j1 , then no nonmovers would hold capital from date 1 to 2, which im-
plies γ = 0. If Rj =
v2
v1
Bi,j1 , then the two assets are perfect substitutes to nonmovers.
Thus, any γ between 0 < γ ≤ 1 is possible. If Rj >
v2
v1
Bi,j1 , no nonmovers would
hold fiat money from date 1 to 2, which implies γ = 1. Then, for the nonmovers to
trade fiat money for capital, it is required that Bi,j1 ≤
Rj
v2/v1
. The maximum price of




Therefore, the aggregate demand for capital (supply of money) of nonmovers is
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If the market has enough liquidity (i.e.,SM > DM ), then the asset price would
reach its highest possible point,
Rj
v2/v1
. However, if the market suffers liquidity short-
age for any reason, the price will be determined by the amount of cash supplied.
This is known as ‘cash-in-the-market pricing’ in which the asset price is determined
as the ratio of total available ‘cash’ to the amount of asset provided (Allen and Gale,
1994, 2009). 
2-2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proof No fiat money is passed over to the date 2, i.e., γ = 1, if and only if the rate




















This implies when the rate of return on capital is high, agents will want to hold
only capital from period 1 to period 2. Since the rate of return on capital takes two
values, it is assumed that the preceding relation holds only when Rj = RH without
loss of generality. The value of γ with RH , γ
H , becomes 1.
On the other hand, some fiat money is stored for the consumption of date 2, i.e.,
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In other words, agents will hold some currency and pass it over to the next period








,39 the price of capital in the state l, Bl,jt , is higher than
or equal to that in the state of h, Bh,jt . Therefore, we have
Rj
v2/v1











Note that, however, Bl1 cannot be equal to B
h










40, which implies that capital dominates fiat money. If agents hold






Bi,j1 = R >
v2
v0
. No one would hold fiat money in the first place, which





Additional condition, Bh,j1 < v1/v0 < B
l,j
1 , is required because otherwise fiat
money is (weakly) dominated by capital as well. If Bl,j1 > B
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1 ≥ v1/v0, then a









. Also, if Bh,j1 < B
l,j









. Therefore we have Bh,j1 < v1/v0 < B
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1 having the fundamental
value.
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where i = {l, h}. γL takes on any value between 0 < γL < 1 depending on parameter
values. 
2-3 Expected utility of uninformed agents






























































































Let the sum of the third and fourth line on the right-hand side be A. Using the fact
B̂i,L1 = RL and by the assumption that vt+s = v, ∀s ≥ 0, B̂
i,L






























Let the sum of the first and second line on the right-hand side be B, then B becomes
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A+B = q + E[Rj]k
2-4 Uninformed agents’ loss due to information
asymmetries


































































and B̂l,L1 = RL, the terms in the square
Chapter 2-4. UNINFORMED AGENTS’ LOSS DUE TO INFORMATION
ASYMMETRIES
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(B̂h,H1 −RL) < 0
The first term in the second line is the sum of the second and third terms in the
first line, and the second term is the sum of the first and fourth terms.
2-5 Expected utility with banks
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2-6 Expected uility with limited participation
EF
′





















































































































= q + αE[Rj]k + (1− α)(q + kE[Rj])
Let the sum of the third and fourth line be A, and using the fact B˘i,L1 = RL and
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λhq + α(1− λh)q + λhRHk + α(1− λ







λlq + α(1− λl)q + λlRHk + α(1− λ
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Therefore,
A+B < q + E[Rj]k
and B is a increasing function of α.
2-7 Non-movers’ Expected Utility under Limited
























































The bank chooses ql and since state h happens, the asset price in state {h,H}




and B˘h,L1 = RL.




(λhql + α(1− λh)ql) + (λhklRH + α(1− λ
h)klRH)
+
(1− λh)(ql + klRH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ql+klRH−λhql−λhklRH










Chapter 2-7. NON-MOVERS’ EXPECTED UTILITY UNDER LIMITED
PARTICIPATION & IMPERFECT INFORMATION
107
Essays on Banking and Finance
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[cm,2 + cn,2] = q
l + E[Rj]k
l = El[cm,2 + cn,2]
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Chapter 3
Bank Liquidity, Securitization, and
the Efficacy of Monetary Policy
3.1 Introduction
Since the seminal studies of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the
maturity structure trade-off between liquid and illiquid assets of a bank, and the liq-
uidity preference resulting from uncertainty about the timing of consumption have
provoked long debates on how banks should hold their assets. Also, the tendency
of excessive securitization, which is considered to be one of the principal causes of
the 2008 financial crisis, raises interest in the relationship between the degree of
securitization and the liquid asset holdings of banks. All these issues have impor-
tant implications for the effective implementation of monetary policy, given that
monetary policy is implemented through the banking system.
This chapter aims to analyse how the need for liquid assets of individual banks,
and the economy as a whole is affected by securitization. Also, it examines how
monetary policy can affect the composition of banks’ portfolio decision and whether
monetary policy can change the composition of assets in the direction desired by it.
Many empirical papers show the effect of securitization on bank liquidity and the
relationship between the efficacy of monetary policy and securitization. Loutskina
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(2011) shows the empirical evidence that bank’s ability to securitize loans reduces
its liquid asset holding. Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011) illustrates the relationships
between the short-term interest rate, securitization, and banks’ asset choices using
Euro area and U.S data. Estrella et al. (2002) and Loutskina (2011) analyse the effect
of securitization on the efficacy of monetary policy using empirical macroeconomic
models. ? argues that securitization alters the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel and increases the capacity to supply new loans. This chapter contributes to
the strand of research by providing theoretical grounds of the effect of securitization
on the economy’s need for liquid assets, which has not been discussed much in the
literature.
In the first part of this paper, I present a model which explain the relationship
between securitization and the bank’s liquid asset holdings, as well as the process
by which banks in two different regions trade securities. This framework provides a
detailed description of how the changes in demand and supply structure of securities
from different islands affect various key economic variables. Securitization not only
allows banks to transform illiquid assets into liquid assets but it also provides an
alternative source of investment in liquid assets. In addition to the liquid asset
holdings in the region where securitization is possible, the liquid asset reserves of
the whole region are significantly reduced compared with before securitization. This
implies the economy uses its resources in a more productive way to increase the
total output across the two islands. One of the main conclusions is that the impact
of securitization on banks’ liquidity, consumption, and welfare is affected by the
population structure of each island. The demographic structure between two regions
affects not only the supply of securities in an area where securitization is present but
also the size of demand in the other region, which may lead to a different equilibrium
through adjustment of securities prices.
These results may have important policy implications, especially when looking
at the work of Caballero (2006), Caballero et al. (2008), and Caballero and Krish-
namurthy (2009), which analyse the effect of global asset shortages on bubbles and
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global imbalances. Caballero (2006) analyse the effect of global asset shortages on
bubbles and global imbalances. Since only some regions of the world are capable
of supplying good quality financial assets, the global shortage of assets may lead
to capital movement from emerging markets to advanced economy, and potentially
cause bubbles. This chapter assumes only one of two islands produce safe securities
and shows how the different population structure affects risk sharing and the welfare
of consumers. The possibility of producing more output through capital inflows from
the island which does not issue securities, however, is limited due to the assumption
that movement of goods between islands is not possible.1
Also, these results have significant similarities with the study of Bencivenga
and Smith (1991). Based on the random relocation economy, Bencivenga and Smith
(1991) showed that the introduction of financial intermediaries might affect the com-
position of savings toward more productive assets (capital) and thus intermediaries
enhance growth by reducing socially unnecessary capital liquidation. Securitization
introduced in this chapter shows that the need for liquid assets, required for movers
facing liquidity shocks but provide low rates of return, can be reduced significantly
in a general equilibrium setting.
In the second part of this chapter, I examine how monetary policy can affect
the composition of banks’ portfolios and whether monetary policy can change the
composition of assets in the direction desired by the monetary authorities. Expan-
sionary monetary policy can affect the bank’s portfolio composition and thus its
depositors’ consumption and welfare, but the outcome depends on the magnitude
of the elasticity of substitution coefficients. When the consumer is less (resp. more)
risk-averse, the substitution effect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the income
effect and banks are willing to hold more (resp. less) liquid assets in response to
higher price levels than would otherwise be the case. However, if a randomised
monetary policy combines with other real shocks, the bank suffers from a signal ex-
1If the assumption is relaxed and capital accumulation is possible, then capital flows toward
the island A, the asset producing region, can result in so-called global imbalances (See Caballero
(2006), Caballero et al. (2008), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009)).
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traction problem. Since banks cannot differentiate between the two elements of real
and nominal factors that determine the current price level, they react to changes in
the nominal supply of money, not real ones. This results in banks holding too many,
and in some cases too few, liquid assets when compared to under full information.
Another interesting question is whether monetary policy can change the composi-
tion of assets in the direction desired by the monetary authorities. More specifically,
let us consider the question of whether monetary authorities will be able to increase
capital investment via expansionary monetary policy if consumers are highly risk-
averse. This chapter shows that the benefits from inflation surprises disappear when
economic agents understand the monetary authorities’ intention and act accordingly.
This leads only to inflation bias as Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon
(1983a,b)’s research shows.2
To address these issues, I used a simple overlapping generations model with
fiat money, following the Lucas’ island model and its simplified version Wallace
(1980). Lucas (1972) showed that a positive short-term correlation between the
rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output exists and argues that
the relationship may disappear when the government tries to exploit it. In Lucas
(1972), consumers live in two spatially separated places and are subject to two
different shocks. The first shock is the stochastic changes in the quantity of money
which may adjust the nominal price levels. The second source of disturbance is
an island-specific population shock. The population of the young in each period is
random; thus it may cause a difference in relative prices between the two places.
Information on these real and monetary shocks is conveyed by the local price, but
in the special framework, prices provide only imperfect information with people.
Those consumers who wish to respond only to real disturbances fail to distinguish
between them; thus nominal monetary shocks have an effect on output.3
2Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) showed the positive correlation
between output and inflation could not arise systematically when agents have rational expectations.
The benefits from inflation surprises disappear when economic agents understand the monetary
authorities’ intention and act accordingly and lead only to inflation bias.
3Wallace (1980) formed a simple model to stress the effect of Lucas (1972)’s incomplete infor-
mation on time series correlation between output and inflation by way of a simple example.
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This chapter and Lucas (1972) have two significant differences. First, this article
examines the linkages between monetary policy and bank holding portfolio com-
position. Second, I deal with spillovers between islands, unlike Lucas (1972)’ and
Wallace (1980)’s analysis where no linkages between islands exist.
The effect of spillovers arises because of the framework whereby the two islands
are linked to each other. Some of the members (movers) of each island move to
different islands at some point after random relocation shocks, which, in combina-
tion with other nominal and real uncertainties, produces interesting results. If two
separate regions are interconnected, then the outcome of the decision made in each
region is related to the choice of another region, and therefore the issue of general
equilibrium is essential. It is of particular importance to look at the interrelation-
ships between the two regions, especially if one region can trade securities with other
parts through the securitization of assets.
For movers to consume after being relocated, they need fiat money, the supply
of which is identical in the two islands and universally accepted as a means of
exchange.4. In order to reflect the preference for liquidity due to the uncertainty of
the consumption place, I followed the setting of Champ et al. (1996).5 In Champ
et al. (1996), the bank provides insurance to agents who have random needs for
liquidity because of the possibility of relocation. The ‘relocation shock’ takes the
place of the ‘preference shock’ in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes
the structure of the physical set-up, information, and money market equilibrium.
Section ?? introduces securitization and analyses the effect of it on banks’ and the
overall needs for liquid assets of the whole economy. Section 3.4 studies the effect of
monetary policy on the bank’s portfolio decision and how a signal extraction problem
arises during the process. Section 3.5 analyses whether the monetary authorities can
4The role of fiat money as a store of value and medium of exchange using OLGs model is
discussed in Samuelson (1958)
5Champ et al. (1996) constructs a monetary model in which a role for currency is considered,
and monetary factors play a particular role in banking panics. However, except for the basic
assumptions and settings, this chapter is not directly related to Champ et al. (1996).
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influence the bank’s portfolio decision when the authorities have a specific goal to
achieve. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 3.6.
3.2 The Structure of the Economy
3.2.1 Environment
There are infinitely many overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods
and thus the economy is populated by two age cohorts: the young and the old.
People live on two spatially separated islands, where communication across the
two islands is limited. The population of the young and the old respectively are
normalised to unity. Therefore, the total population of the economy are added up
to 2. The number of the old in this economy is equally divided by two distinct
locations. The young, however, are distributed unequally across the islands. Let
the population of the young in each island at date t be N it where i = {H,L}. Let N
H
t
denote the island having large population and NLt being an island with small number
of the young. Since the population of the young are normalized to 1, NHt +N
L
t = 1.
The probability of the island i has NHt (resp. N
L
t ) is ωH (resp. ωL). According
to Lucas (1972) notation, let NHt = θ/2 and N
L
t = 1 − θ/2, where 1 < θ < 2 is a




t , with probability ωL
NHt , with probability ωH ,
The information about N it is unknown to agents.
At the end of each period the stochastic relocation shocks occur and a fraction
of movers among the young agents, λ, are relocated to the other island at the end of
the same period and will spend their final time on the island. For N it and N
j
t+1 are
assumed to be serially uncorrelated, the young who are born at date t in an island
i, and subject to being relocated to the island j, will face two different population
distribution of the young at date t+ 1. The assumption that the old population of
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the two islands are equally distributed implies that the parameter λ is 1/2.6
There are two separate types of assets for savings: capital and fiat money. The
capital is regarded as an illiquid asset for two reasons. Firstly, the capital investment
needs two periods of time before it transformed into consumption goods. Secondly,
capital is assumed not to be transported across islands, and moreover, due to the
‘limited communication’, claims against capital is assumed to be useless. For movers
to consume after being relocated, they need fiat money which is identical in the two
islands and universally accepted as a means of exchange.
Total money supply is expected to grow or remain constant. The nominal price
of one unit of the goods at date t is pt and thus one unit of the good invested
in fiat money at date t yields pt/pt+1 ≤ 1 units of the consumption good because
pt+1 is expected to be greater than pt. The illiquid asset represented by capital is
a constant-returns-to-scale technology that takes two periods to mature and allows
one unit of the good invested in the current period to be converted into R > 1 units
of the good at date t+ 1. R is considered to have a definite value, in order to focus
more on the uncertainty of the rate of return on money and the effect of monetary
policy on the agent’s portfolio decision.
3.2.2 Preferences
Agents are risk-averse and consume only at their final period. Agents, who are born
at time t, are ex-ante identical and individually observe relocation shocks in the
middle of date t after making a savings decision. This information is privately held
and not observable by other agents. Expected utility of the generation born at time
6Unless λ = 1/2, the population of the two different islands is not equal to each other. The
population of the old on the island H after the transfer of movers is NH − λ(NH −NL) and that
of the island L is NL − λ(NL − NH). Since the elderly population of the two islands should be
the same, the following holds true.
NH − λ(NH −NL) = NL + λ(NH −NL)
⇔NH −NL = 2λ(NH −NL)
⇔λ = 1/2
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t are represented by:
Et[U(cm,t+1, cn,t+1)] = λu(cm,t+1) + (1− λ)u(cn,t+1),
where cm,t+1 and cn,t+1 denote consumption of a mover and a nonmover respectively,






where σ = − cu
′′(c)
u′(c)
denotes the degree of relative risk aversion. The utility function
satisfies the usual neoclassical properties.
3.2.3 Supply of Fiat Money
The central bank controls a monetary instrument, the aggregate money supply,
which enables it to choose the current price level, pt. Let Mt be the total money





where Mt−1 is a predetermined variable and z
k
t denotes the gross rate of money




t , with probability εL
zHt , with probability εH ,
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Increases in the fiat money at date t is assumed to be distributed to the old propor-
tional to an individual’s balances of fiat money as in Lucas (1972). Wallace (1980)
assumes differently that the increases in the stock of fiat money are subsidies which
are allocated through lump-sum subsidies to each old person in each period t. In
this model the subsidies are distributed to the old because only the movers among








This special assumption is used because the model uses a discrete sample space. See
Wallace (1980) for a detailed explanation.
3.2.4 Money Market Equilibrium
No one in the future generations is born with fiat money. For young agents born at
date t to acquire fiat money, they must trade with the initial old who are endowed
in total with Mt units of fiat money at date t. The supply of fiat money in each
island in period t is Mt/2 because the population of the old is distributed equally
on each island. The demand for the fiat money comes from the young. Let qit be
the real demand for money from the individual young agent born on an island i at
time t. In other words, qit denotes the number of goods each young agent chooses to
sell her fraction of endowment for fiat money. Then the total real demand for fiat
money in the island i is N it q
i
t.
The local price of consumption goods of the island i at date t, pit, is determined
at the beginning of period t by the coincidence of the demand for fiat money by the
young and the supply of it by the old. Since uncertainties in the determination of
current price level are the population of the young on the island i, and the money





Therefore, from now on denote the price level of the island i with the gross rate
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t ). The money market equilibrium
condition implies the following
zktMt−1
2pit
















where j, l = {L,H}.
Let qikt be the real money demand of agents living on the island i and facing

















The distribution of the rate of return on fiat money will depend on the realizations




t , and z
l
t+1. The price level at date t+1 is assumed
to be serially uncorrelated with the current period t, and thus the price level at date
t + 1 is independent of that at date t. Therefore, the rate of return on fiat money
depends only on the current price level. Therefore, qikt is expressed as a function of
pikt .
3.2.5 Complete Information
I will divide the information structure that banks face into two different parts fol-
lowing Wallace (1980). In this part I deal with complete information case where the
individual bank, h, on the island i optimises its depositors’ expected utility knowing
the value of zkt . The knowledge of z
k
t and the observed price p
ik
t gives the precise
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have access to the distributions of them. The second case deals with the incom-
plete information set where banks do not observe zkt , and only have access to the
distributions of zkt and N
i
t in Section 3.4.
Suppose that the young agents deposit all of their endowment goods with a
bank, and the bank uses the proceeds to acquire assets in favour of its depositors.
Banks compete for offering deposit contract to maximise the expected utility of their
depositors due to free entry into the banking industry. Therefore, the bank’s problem
is to choose how much capital and fiat money to acquire in order to maximise the
ex-ante expected utility of the young.




to maximise its depositor’ expected utility, knowing the value of zkt . Then the rate
of return on fiat money, (3.4), may take four different values because only N jt+1 are
pjlt+1 are random variables. The probability of each event occurring is ω
jεl.
Consumption
A mover consumes with her posttransfer fiat money balances. Consumption of a











cik,jlm,t+1 denotes the consumption of a mover who is born on the island i and moves
to the island j at date t + 1 with the gross rate of money supply expansion zkt at
date t and zlt+1 during period t + 1. The first term on the right-hand side denotes
pretransfer money balances and the second term is subsidies transferred from the
central bank proportional to their pretransfer balances. The preceding equation is
simplified as
7k in the superscript denotes the states of the gross rate of money supply expansion.
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On the other hand, the consumption of nonmovers is not affected by the expected






















subject to a budget constraint,
qik,ht + k
ik,h
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and (3.5), (3.6).
First, the bank determines how to divide its member’s endowment goods between
real money demand and capital at date t. The second decision made by the bank is
about how much it should pay to movers who must withdraw at the end of date t.
The constraint (3.9) shows how this decision is made. The bank makes a standard






, at date t by paying out all available liquid assets, divided
equally among those withdrawing.8 Nonmovers are paid whatever is available at
their final period which is shown in constraint (3.10). The constraint (3.10) says
that the consumption by nonmovers are limited by the total value of the risky asset,
capital, plus the amount of fiat money left over after the movers are paid off if any.
The constraint (3.11), which denotes incentive compatibility constraint, says that
consumption by nonmovers must be at least as much as the promised real money to
movers. Since whether a certain agent is relocated or not is private information, and
thus, the bank cannot identify who is a mover and who is a nonmover, nonmovers
have an incentive to pretend to be a mover unless this constraint holds. The incentive
constraint tells us that a nonmover does not have any incentive to pretend to be a
mover as long as she would get a higher level of the consumption good at their final
period.
Since all members of the young on the island i are identical, and so are the
behaviour of banks located on the island i. Therefore, the bank h’s decision on
qik,ht is identical to per capita real money holdings living on the island i, q
ik
t . By
substituting the budget constraint into objective function and letting qik,ht = q
ik
t , the
8If the bank does not have enough liquid assets to make the promised amount to movers at
date t, the bank will go bankruptcy. However, bank runs are not considered in this chapter, and
we assume banks do not suffer runs.
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where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers which both have non-negative values. Note
that the incentive constraint (3.11) are not included in the preceding equation. As
shown below, this is because the incentive constraint is always satisfied automatically
when we optimize this problem only with the first three constraints.9
As the first-order conditions with respect to consumption, we have the following
















Non-binding feasibility condition (3.9) implies that cik,jlm,t+1 = c
ik
n,t+1 because µ1 = 0
and λ = 1/2. When (3.9) is binding, it implies cik,jlm,t+1 < c
ik
n,t+1 because µ1 > 0.
Therefore, the incentive constraint is always satisfied in any case.

























Solving the preceding equation gives us the optimal value of qikt where i = {L,H}.
9See Allen and Gale (1998).
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3.3 Financial Innovation: securitization
securitization10 is the process of taking illiquid assets and transforming them into
liquid assets, and thus it allows banks to liquidate illiquid assets to finance their
liquidity need. This section studies how financial development, represented by secu-
ritization, changes the financial intermediary’s portfolio decision and how it alters
the aggregate needs for liquid assets used for the consumption of agents facing liq-
uidity shocks.11 Also, I show that securitization not only allows banks to transform
illiquid assets into liquid but also provides an alternative source for the investment
in liquid assets.
Now let us call the two islands as the island A and island B.12 Suppose that only
the A island has an ability to generate (produce) liquid financial assets13 appealing
to (demanded by) foreign consumers who face liquidity shocks. The reason for
making this assumption is to reflect the reality that not all countries in the world
can supply financial assets. The population structure of the islands is important
because it changes the relative size of demand for and supply of securities, and
thus alters the bank’s portfolio decision and the relevant equilibria values. A small
population of the young on the island A means that an insufficient supply of quality
financial assets increases the security price and potentially leads to bubbles and
crisis, the possibility of which is not discussed in this chapter.
This section deals with the global equilibrium, in which the demand for and
supply of ABS is equated in the securities market. The equilibrium of each island
is affected by the decision made by the other island. I assume that the total money
10Financial innovation is a term widely used in relation to the act of creating new financial insti-
tutions, markets, instruments as well as inventing a new process for distributing financial services.
Among the many contents related to financial innovation, this section explores securitization in
particular and investigates how securitization affects the liquidity needs of banks.
11There are many potential benefits both to the issuer and investors when illiquid assets are
securitized. For example, the issuer may manage interest rate risk better, improve her liquidity
level, and diversify funding sources, and so forth. I do not develop the detailed process and various
benefits of securitization, nor cover the important features regarding theoretical issues of security
design happening in the asymmetric information situation. For these matters see Gorton and
Metrick (2012).
12Therefore, i and j are expressed as i, j = {A,B} rather than i, j = {L,H}
13Future returns that capital generates are used as the collateral for these securities. From now
on, let us call these securities ABS.
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supply does not change in this section. The reason for taking this assumption is
to concentrate on the analysis on how securitization affects the amount of liquid
assets held by the banks, by assuming that the amount of liquid assets required
by the banks fluctuates only by real factors.14 More specifically, I assume that
zt+s = 1, ∀s ≥ 0. Then the price level the bank on the island i at date t and island






































The rate of return on fiat money is only determined by real factors, N and q.
3.3.1 The securitization Market
Banks located on the island A (originators) begin the securitization process by gath-
ering a series of illiquid assets (capital) and issue securities, which are backed by the
assets (capital) they hold. They then sell the securities (ABS) to the banks located
on the island B. The originator will have received proceeds from the securitization,
and the proceeds (fiat money) are used for the consumption of movers. The returns
generated by the underlying assets (capital on the island A) are then transferred to
the investors who purchase the asset-backed securities, the bank B. More specifi-
cally, the returns are consumed by movers from the island B. During the process,
the A bank is able to increase overall liquidity by securitizing illiquid assets into
liquid assets and to generate immediate proceeds from their assets. These proceeds
14If there is no uncertainty in the economy and the population of both islands does not change,
then the island A, which can securitize illiquid assets, can enjoy perfect risk-sharing. See the
Appendix 3-1.
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give the bank the potential to reduce the amount invested in liquid assets.15
Let kAt be the investment in capital which the bank on the island A chooses, and
assume that the A bank securitizes its capital at a rate of α among its holdings of
capital kAt . And let bt be the (nominal) price of ABS which promises to provide
R units of consumption goods per unit of securities at date t + 1. Then, the total
supply of ABS are NAt αk
A
t Rbt.
Banks on the B island invest in securities with fiat money they hold. Suppose
that the B bank uses β percentage of its total currency among its holdings of fiat






























The price of the securities depends on the bank A’s decision on kAt and α, and the
bank B’s portfolio decision about qBt and β. Moreover, it relies on the parameter
values of NAt and N
B
t . Since N
i
t is a random variable so bt is.
17 When the population
of the young on the island A is large, i.e., NAt = N
H
t , then the supply of securities
will be bigger than the case of NAt = N
L
t , which leads to lower securities price. The
value of N it also affects the size of α and β, as illustrated in the example described
below.
15Typically, there exist several players in the securitization process, such as originators, special
purpose vehicles, credit rating agencies, and investors, and so forth. I simplified the process by
assuming the securities issued by originators (banks on the island A) are sold directly to investors
(the banks on the island B) and no uncertainties arise during the process since the rate of return
on the securities are certain. This simplification is intended to reveal more clearly the relationship
between securitization and bank’s liquidity need, without considering irrelevant details. See Gorton
and Metrick (2012) for a rigorous securitization process and related issues.
16It is assumed that neither short selling nor interbank lending are allowed, which implies 0 ≤
α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
17The island A can have the population of the young either NHt or N
L
t .
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3.3.2 The Supply Side of securitization: Island A
The bank on the island A determines how to construct a portfolio (qAt , k
A
t ) and how
much capital to securitize in order to maximise its depositors’ expected utility. Since
banks on the island A securitize their capital investment at the rate of α, the total



















because the B bank uses β percentage of its fiat money to purchase securities. Then,
the aggregate consumption of movers who are born in the island A and are relocated






































where A, j = {L,H}. The last line of the above equation is derived from the ABS
market equilibrium condition (3.14).
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The preceding analysis shows that the securitization can reduce the total liquid
asset holdings of the A bank in its portfolio by αkAt btR than before capital is secu-
ritized. Thus, the bank on the A island can invest its resources in a more efficient
place, i.e., in capital, and thus produce more output in total than before securitiza-
tion. If the young population of the A island can be used as a substitute for the A
bank’s ability to securitize illiquid assets, the larger the population of the island A
(NAt ), the smaller the amount of liquid assets (q
A
t ) that must be retained.
Using the above facts, we can construct the maximization problem as follows.













subject to (3.15), (3.16), the budget constraint,
qAt + k
A



























18No subsidies are given to movers since there is no money expansion.
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+ (1− α)kAt R− λc
A,j




















Non-binding feasibility condition (3.9) implies that cA,jm,t+1 = c
A
n,t+1 because µ1 = 0.
When (3.20) is binding, the consumption becomes cA,jm,t+1 = c
A
n,t+1 because µ1 > 0.
Therefore, the incentive constraint is always satisfied.









































Solving the equations (3.22) and (3.23) gives us the optimal value of qAt and α,
given the price of ABS, bt.
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3.3.3 The Demand Side of securitization: Island B






Among fiat money obtained, the island B trades β fraction of the money for ABS
































where B, j = {L,H}. The first term on the right hand side of the first line denotes
the consumption due to real money holdings, excluding β rate used to purchase
securities. The second term is returns generated by the underlying assets (capital in
the island A). The second line is obtained using (3.24) and (3.14). The aggregate




























The bank’s problem is to choose qBt and β to maximize its depositors’ expected
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+ kBt R− λc
B
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Solving the equations (3.28) and (3.29) gives us the optimal value of qBt and β given
the price of ABS, bt.
3.3.4 Numerical Example
In this example, we use the same parameter values as in Section 3.4.3 to see how
securitization affects various equilibrium values. The results are illustrated in Ta-
ble 3.1 and 3.2. The column I deals with the case of relatively large supply of
securities (NAt = N
H
t ), and the column II shows the equilibrium values when the
supply is small, and demand is high (NAt = N
L
t ). As in the numerical examples
in Section 3.4.3, the liquid asset holdings is increased as agents tend to be more
risk-averse.
When NAt = N
H
t , the supply of ABS is large (and the demand for it is small)
enough so that the price of the securities is lower than when NAt = N
L
t for any
given σ. The willingness to narrow the gap in consumption between movers and
nonmovers is increased as σ is bigger, and thus the banks on the island A issues
more ABS to finance the mover’s consumption. This is reflected in the increase in
α as σ increases in column I. Sufficient supply of securities, together with relatively
lower price, the banks on the island B trade all their fiat money for ABS. This
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results in β = 1 in the column I. When β = 1, movers on the island B do not hold
money but hold only securities. Therefore, they are not affected by the price level of
the island j at date t + 1 and thus face no uncertainty on their consumption. This
result is illustrated as cB,Hm,t+1 = c
B,L
m,t+1 when β = 1.
Table 3.1: Equilibria for Variables
I II
σ A = H B = L A = L B = H
0.5
qit 0.1793 0.4458 0.2274 0.2851





qit 0.2500 0.5000 0.3333 0.5000





qit 0.2818 0.4880 0.3990 0.5985




Let us compare the Table 3.1 with the column I in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6b.
The A island’s real demand for fiat money is decreased substantially with any σ and
irrespective of whether A = H or A = L. The aggregate need for the real money
demand of the economy, qAt + q
B
t , is reduced significantly as well, which implies
the economy uses its resources more productive way to increase the total output
across the two islands. Table 3.1 also shows that, given σ value, the demand for real
money, qAt , is lower when N
A




t , which implies that the greater
the scope of securitization of the bank, the smaller the amount of liquid assets it
requires.
Table 3.2 illustrates the consumption of each type of agents and expected utility.
The overall welfare of all islands increases significantly due to more capital holdings.
However, note that the impact of securitization on consumption and welfare is also
affected by the population structure of each island. The price of securities, bt, is
higher when the population of the island issuing securities is small, i.e., when the
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Table 3.2: Consumption and Utility with securitization
(I) (II)

























































































































supply of securities is relatively small compared to when it is large. It is natural that
the value of relatively few existing assets should increases. Due to the high-security
prices, both the consumption and welfare of the movers born on the island B fall,
compared to when the securities prices are low (column II).
3.4 Effect of Monetary Policy with Incomplete In-
formation
The financial intermediary now chooses qit not knowing z
k
t . The realized value of
zkt is kept unknown from the young until the date t ends, but the bank knows the




t+1. Prices are the only thing the bank can directly
observe.
The bank needs to infer the population of the young who are born on the island
i by observing the current price level, pikt . Rewriting the equation.(3.2), using the
fact qik,ht = q
ik
t , then the price level of the island i and the rate of return on fiat
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Since zkt and N
i
t take two different values respectively, p
ik
t may have four different
forms. By Assumption 6, however, pikt can take only three different values depending
on the distributions of zkt and N
i
t . Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the price levels
which depend on the realizations of zkt and N
j
t+1.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Price
Population of the Young



































As shown in (3.30), the knowledge of the price level of the island i, pikt , implies
knowledge of zkt /N
i




t , it is able to
infer the correct states of nature it faces. In other words, when the bank observes
the price pikt when i 6= k, the observed p
ik





More specifically, the observation of pHLt allows the bank to understand the states
of nature as N it = N
H
t and zk = zL. Likewise, if the price level p
LH
t is observed, the
bank has access to the exact information that N it = N
L
t and zk = zH .
Note that, however, pHHt is equal to p
LL
t , which implies that the observed price
pHHt is indistinguishable from p
LL





. This analysis shows that banks face a signal extraction problem. The
bank cannot elicit the correct signal of the random variable by observing the price
because there are two unknown variables (N it and zk) while the bank has access to
only one information, pikt . The revealed price p
HH
t means that the demand for money
is high due to large young population, but the supply of it is also high because of
high zkt . And when the island watches the price p
LL
t , both the demand for and
supply of fiat money are low. If the revealed price level is pLLt = p
HH
t ≡ p̂t, then the
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true state of nature is either N it = N
L
















Unlike Section 3.2.5, the price level does not reveal the true state of nature if
i 6= k. Now divide the consumption conditional on the distribution of inflation into
two different cases following Wallace (1980): (1) the actual state of nature revealed
(i 6= k), and (2) the true states of nature are not revealed (i = k).
The Case of i 6= k
Let the consumption of a mover (a nonmover) be cik,jlm,t+1 (c
ik
n,t+1), who is born on the






















Since the true values of N it and z
k
t are revealed from observing the price p
ik
t
when i 6= k, the consumption of movers has four different distributions for each
i depending on the state j and l. The consumption of movers born in H island
(resp. L island) is expressed as cHL,jlm,t+1 (resp. c
LH,jl
m,t+1). When a bank’s objective
is to maximize its depositors’ expected utility, the problem posed will be that of
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subject to (3.8), (3.9), (3.10),19 (3.11), (3.32), and (3.33).
















































Note that the preceding equation has the same form as (3.12) in complete informa-
tion case. Solving the preceding equation gives us the optimal values of qHLt and
qLHt .
The Case of i = k
When i = k, we know that the information on pikt does not reveal the precise values




t = p̂t may imply either (i, k) = (L,L) or (i, k) = (H,H).








, where i = {L,H} (3.36)
The preceding equation has 4 different values depending on the realizations of j
and l for each i = {L,H}. The state of i can be either H or L and the bank cannot
distinguish them since the true state of i is not revealed. Therefore, the mover’s
consumption can take eight different values depending on the states of i, j and l,
and the probability of each event happening is ωiωjεk, where i, j, k = {L,H}. We
19The feasibility conditions are also rewritten using qik,ht = q
ik
t .
20Incentive constraint is satisfied as well.
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subject to (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.36), and (3.38). The Lagrangian function






















































Solving the preceding equation gives us the optimal level of investment in fiat





21Incentive constraint is satisfied as well.
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3.4.1 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Portfolio Decision
The main question in this section is to study how the bank’s portfolio decision is
affected by the current price level. Let G define an implicit function
G(pikt , q
ik










R = 0, (3.41)







































The sign of the preceding equation is negative because u′′(·) < 0. Using the implicit
















> 0, when σ < 1
= 0, when σ = 1
< 0, when σ > 1
(3.42)
The current price level, given the future price of goods, pjlt+1, and the rate of
return on capital, R, has a different effect on the demand for fiat money, which
is conditional on the degree of relative risk aversion.22 When agents are less risk
averse (σ < 1), a higher local price, pikt , leads to an increase in investment in fiat
money. The substitution effect dominates income effect because agents are willing
to substitute more fiat money for capital. Therefore, the amount of qikt rises as p
ik
t
22Diamond (1965) used the similar approach like this to analyse the effect of changes in real
wage on the interest rate.
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increases. On the other hand, if agents are more risk averse (σ > 1), the income effect
dominates the substitution effect; a higher price level will reduce the willingness to
hold currency. qikt is reduced as p
ik
t decreases. When σ = 1 (the log case), the real
money demand does not depend on the current price level.
This result has an important implication for the central bank who may wish to
affect the bank’s portfolio decision by changing the current price level. Suppose
that a central bank has a capital investment target that is higher than the natural
level of capital investment at which the economy would return to normally. Then,
(3.42) tells us that the monetary authorities’ effort to enhance capital investment is
effective only when consumers have higher relative risk aversion parameter, that is,
only when σ > 1.23
3.4.2 The Effect of Inflation on Consumption









































Also, we may express the resource constraint the bank facing, (3.8), by taking rele-








= 1 + (zlt+1 − 1)q
ik
t
23In Section 3.5 I show that even in the case of σ > 1, however, the central bank’s attempt is
not effective when agents have rational expectations.
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The second term on the right-hand side of the preceding equation denotes the
present value of subsidies given to the old which is not related to the bank’s budget
constraint, but is necessary to calculate the consumption of a mover.24 Therefore,
the right hand side represents the present value of consumption of a mover and




















denotes the future value of the endowment goods
along with the government subsidies. Substituting (3.43) into the modified resource


























































denotes the relative ratio of rate of returns between illiquid and liquid as-




is always greater than 1. The preceding consumption
function shows how a change in the current price level affects the consumption of
movers.
When σ > 1, the income effect from the increase in pikt dominates the substitution
effect.25 The bank is willing to decrease the investment in liquid assets and thus






t+1. For a discount factor we use the rate of










is increasing in pikt .
140Chapter 3.4. EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
Essays on Banking and Finance
the consumption of movers declines. When σ = 1, the bank’s decision on the
portfolio choice does not depend on the current price level. If the agent’s coefficient
of relative risk aversion is less than 1, the substitution effect dominates the income
effect26: the bank wishes to hold more liquid assets, fiat money, to substitute mover’s
consumption for nonmover’s consumption.
The effect of changes in the current price level on nonmover’s consumption can
be simply obtained by differentiating nonmover’s consumption with respect to pikt ,




















< 0, when σ < 1
= 0, when σ = 1
> 0, when σ > 1
The second line of the preceding equation is obtained from (3.42). When σ < 1, the
rise in pikt increases the rate of return on money, thus increases q
ik
t and decreases k
ik
t
by the same amount. On the other hand, if σ > 1, then the higher current price level
reduces the liquid asset holding and increases the capital investment. This increases
the consumption of nonmovers.
3.4.3 Numerical Example
Let’s look at numerical examples analysed in this section using specific parameter




t = 1− θ/2 = 1/3, with probability ωL = 1/2








is an decreasing function of pikt .
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t = 1, with probability εL = 1/2
zHt = 2, with probability εH = 1/2,
which satisfies Assumption 6. The rate of return on capital, R, is assumed to be 2.
The predetermined money supply Mt−1 is normalized to 1. I analyse three different
values of σ = 0.5, 1, 1.5 respectively to examine the effect of different σ on equilibria.
Complete Information & No Uncertainty on Monetary Shocks
First of all, let us look at the case where the money supply does not change at all
and remains constant, which implies zt = zt+1 = 1. Secondly, suppose the case of
a once-and-for-all higher level of money supply causing the high current price level,
i.e., zt = 2 and zt+1 = 1. Those results are shown in column I and II of the Table 3.4
and 3.5 with three different values of σ. The only uncertainty consumers face is the
population of the young at date t+ 1, N jt+1.
The price level of the island with a large young population is lower than that
of the island with a small population, the result of which is natural from (3.2).
The high demand for money causes a higher price level than otherwise. Given the
population of the young, the money demand is greater as the agents become more
risk-averse. When agents are less risk averse (σ < 1), the higher local price, pikt ,
leads to more investment in fiat money. In the column I of Table 3.4, the local price
of the island L, pLt = 3.9096, is higher than p
H
t = 2.5775. This leads to higher real
demand for money in island L, qLt = 0.3837, than q
H
t = 0.2910. This is because, as
explained in Section 3.4.1, the substitution effect dominates income effect, and thus
agents are willing to substitute more fiat money for capital. Therefore, the amount
of qit rises as p
ik
t increases.
On the other hand, if agents are more risk averse (σ > 1), the higher price level
will reduce the willingness to hold currency. This is illustrated as a lower local price
pH1t = 1.2699 < p
L1
t = 2.8446 and leads to a higher q
H
t = 0.5939 > q
L
t = 0.5273.
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Income effect dominates the substitution effect and thus qit is reduced as p
i
t decreases.
When σ = 1 (the log case),27 the real money demand doesn’t depend on the current
price level. Therefore, even though pHt = 1.5 < p
L
t = 3.0, the real demand for money
on both islands are the same at qHt = q
L
t = 0.5. These results are consistent with
the conclusions analysed in Section 3.4.1, and (3.42).
Table 3.5 illustrates the consumption of each type of agent and expected utility.
When σ > 1, i.e., cu′(c) is decreasing in c, the optimal deposit contract gives movers
more consumption at date t + 1 than the market solution. The bank invests more
in the liquid asset at the expense of capital investment (i.e., qit increases and k
i
t
decreases), and therefore movers enjoy higher consumption than in the cases of
σ = 1 or σ < 1. Cross-subsidy between movers and nonmovers occur.
Note that the values in the column II in Table 3.4 and 3.5 are exactly the same
as the column I. This is because the once-and-for-all increase in money stocks does
not affect the rate of return on fiat money28 and thus returns on illiquid assets.
Therefore, money is neutral in this specific example.
Table 3.4: Equilibria for Numerical Example
I II
zt = zt+1 = 1 zt = 2,zt+1 = 1
σ H L H L
0.5
qit 0.2910 0.3837 0.2910 0.3837
pit 2.5775 3.9096 5.1550 7.8193
pit+1 2.5775 3.9096 5.1550 7.8193
1
qit 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
pit 1.5000 3.0000 3.0000 6.0000
pit+1 1.5000 3.0000 3.0000 6.0000
1.5
qit 0.5939 0.5273 0.5939 0.5273
pit 1.2629 2.8446 2.5258 5.6892
pit+1 1.2629 2.8446 2.5258 5.6892
27This result is equal to the market solution as studied in detail in Chapter 1.
28The total money supply at date t, Mt is equal to Mt+1.
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Table 3.5: Consumption and Utility under Complete Information
I II




















































































































The results of the numerical example under incomplete information are described
in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The results that the local prices depend on the demographic
structure and the changes in the demand for money conditional on the different
values of σ is the same as that under complete information. The main difference
between complete and incomplete information is that under incomplete information
banks face three different price levels depending on how uncertainties are realised.









Since pLLt = p
HH
t , the real demand for money in (i, k) = (L,L) is equal to the real
demand under (i, k) = (H,H). Thus, when i = k, the real demand for money qHHt
is identical with qLLt , regardless of the value of σ.
On the other hand, when i 6= k, the real demand for money takes different values
as σ fluctuates. More specifically, qikt has the following relationship according to the
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(b) Real demand for money, qikt
Table 3.6: Price and real money demand





















t , if σ > 1
These results are in accordance with (3.42). When i = k and σ = 0.5, banks on
both islands equally holds as much money as qHHt = q
LL
t = q̂t = 0.3837. This amount
of q̂t is less than what a bank would have if it knew it had a smaller population and
less if it had known it had a larger population. Similarly, when i = k and σ = 1.5,
the amount of money held by each bank is equal to q̂t, which is more than the amount
that the bank would have had if it had known it had a larger population, and less
than the amount that would have been retained if the bank had known it had a
smaller population. Since banks cannot differentiate between the two elements of
real and nominal factors that determine the current price level, they react to changes
in nominal supply of money, not real ones.29
29These results are similar to those of Lucas (1972) and Wallace (1980). They show that ran-
domised monetary policy does not always increase output because consumers are confused by
“money illusion”.
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Table 3.7: Consumption and EU for Incomplete Information
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3.5 Monetary Policy
An interesting question is whether the central bank (CB) is able to affect the bank’s
portfolio decision by adjusting the price level through money supply expansion.
Suppose that the capital investment at date t is determined according to the fol-
lowing equation, which resembles the standard Phillips curve. Moreover, assume
that σ > 1, which implies a higher current price level will increase the investment
in capital by reducing liquid asset investment (see (3.42)).
kt = k¯ + α(pt − p
e
t ) (3.46)
where α(> 0) is a parameter showing how much capital investment responds to
unexpected changes in the price level, pet is private sector expected price level formed
at the beginning of period t, and k¯ denotes the natural level of capital investment.
If σ > 1, then a higher price level may reduce the willingness to hold currency and
thus surprised increase in the price level may bring higher capital investment than
natural level (see (3.43)).
he CB wishes to minimise the sum of the differences between the price level and
its target, and between capital investment and its target by choosing the current
price level of date t, pt. The loss function takes the following form following a
standard quadratic loss function a la Barro and Gordon (1983).
Lt = (kt − φk¯)
2 + β(pt − p¯)
2, β > 0, φ > 1 (3.47)
where β is a parameter capturing the weight of the inflation objective relative to
capital investment, and φ > 1 means that the CB has a capital investment target
that is higher than the level of capital investment at which the economy would return
normally.
In the following, I study the effect of monetary policy on the bank’s portfolio
choice under the two different regimes: policy under discretion and rule.
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3.5.1 Policy under Discretion
Let us suppose the CB acts in a discretionary way and minimizes its loss function
in period t taking pet as given. Using (3.46) to substitute out kt in (3.47), and














βp¯+ α2pet + α(φ− 1)k¯
) (3.48)
Let pdt denote the optimal level of price in period t set by the policymaker. If the
private sector expectations about the price level is equal to the price level target,





since the second term on the right hand side of the previous equation, α(φ−1)k¯
α2+β
, which
is called a price bias, is positive, pdt is greater than p¯. The level of price set by the
policymaker is higher than the one expected by the private sector.
Let kdt be the equilibrium capital investment at date t when the CB enforces the
discretionary monetary policy, then kdt is obtained by substituting p
d
t in (3.49) for
pt in (3.46) and by putting p¯ = p
e
t ,
kdt = k¯ + α(pt − p
e












Let Ldt be the social welfare loss when kt = k
d
t and pt = p
d
t . Inserting these equilibria
values into the loss function, (3.47), we obtain the level of social welfare loss that
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this policy can achieve,
Ldt = (kt − φk¯)































3.5.2 Policy under a Rule
Let Lr2 denote the social welfare loss when the CB follows the rule maintaining
pt = p¯. Then the private sector expectations on the price level, p
e
t , is equal to p¯.






because pet = p¯ and thus kt = k¯ + α(pt − p
e
t ) = k¯. Comparing (3.51) with (3.52), it
is clear that Lrt > L
d
t and a policy commitment to target price level, p¯, have caused
higher social losses.
This analysis may justify the use of discretionary monetary policy rather than
following policy rules. It is wrong, however, to conclude that because private sector
expectations are actually wrong. In fact, the public can anticipate the policymaker’s
incentive, and they can adjust their expectations so that pet = p
d
t .








and thus the optimal price level in period t is obtained by substituting the preceding
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βp¯+ α2pdt + α(φ− 1)k¯
)
Let pd∗t be the price level when the previous equation is solved for p
d





The equilibrium output kd∗t with p
d∗
t is obtained by substituting p
d∗
t in (3.53) for




t , which yields the following
kd∗t = k¯ (3.54)
Inserting these equilibria values into the loss function, (3.47), we obtain the level
of social welfare that this policy can achieve, Ld∗t ,
Ld∗t = (k


























Now, the social welfare loss under discretion, (3.55) is bigger than that of rule,
(3.52). The analysis here shows that the positive correlation between the current
price level and the capital investment cannot arise systematically when agents have
rational expectations when σ > 1.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I formed a general equilibrium model using the Lucas island model
and the random-relocation model. In the first part of this chapter, I dealt with the
effect of securitization on banks liquidity needs. I showed that the amount of liquid
assets held by the overall economy as well as the regions where securitisation begins,
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decrease significantly with securitisation than before securitization. As the economy
can invest its resources in a more efficient place, both consumption and welfare
increase. However, the impact of securitization on banks’ liquidity, consumption,
and welfare is affected by the population structure of each region. This result may
have important policy implications on the effect of global asset shortages on bubbles
and global imbalances. The main results of the second part of this chapter are that
the expansionary monetary policy can affect the bank’s portfolio composition, but
the outcome depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution coefficients.
A randomised monetary policy combined with other real shocks cause banks to suffer
a signal extraction problem as explained in Lucas (1972).
This chapter answers some interesting questions such as how banks should hold
their assets when facing the maturity structure trade-off and its depositor’s liquid-
ity preference shocks, and the effect of securitization on a bank’s portfolio choice.
Nevertheless, this article has the following limitations. First of all, in this chapter, I
assumed the rate of return on illiquid assets is deterministic. While that assumption
makes the exposition as simple as possible on the one hand, interesting questions
such as optimal security design resulting from asymmetric information on the asset
values, and the effect of those uncertainties on banks runs, systemic risk and stabil-
ity in financial networks could be answered with the relaxation of this assumption.
Also, the issues regarding banking distress that banks may be more susceptible to
liquidity crisis with securitisation market distress are not dealt with in this chapter.
Moreover, since capital is assumed to depreciate completely, the dynamic effect of
capital accumulation is ignored. These issues will be dealt with in further research.
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3-1 Complete Information & No Uncertainty
In this appendix it is shown that the agents who are born on the island A are able
to obtain perfect risk sharing under certain assumptions.
Suppose that the money market is held in the beginning of each period where
the initial old and the young gather in the specific place to trade fiat money for
goods. This allows the price structure to be simpler because now we have a single
price that is common to both islands. Also, assume that money supply is constant















Each island i = (A,B) holds N it q
i
t units of money in total respectively. The popula-
tion structure of each island at date t is uncertain, which means the population of
the island A can be large or small with equal probability. However, suppose that the
population at date t+ 1 is the same as that at date t, i.e., assume that NAt = N
A
t+1
and NBt = N
B
t+1. The population of the young of the island i is assumed to be




































t+1 = 1. Except for the structure of the rate of return
on money, all other premises are the same as before. From ((3.29)), the securities
price is given as the price level at date t+ 1, which equal to pt, is given ash .
bt = pt+1 (56)
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Perfect risk sharing is attained for people born on the island A. From the feasibility














n,t+1 = R by letting α = 0.5.
Whether the island A has large or small population does not affect the equilibrium
values and only changes the price level.
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